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Article 5

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
NebraskaLaw Review takes pride in presenting the third annual
Supreme Court Review. This section is devoted to analyses of
recent decisions which the Review staff believes are cases of first
impression or landmark rulings which substantially alter a particular area of case law in Nebraska. We hope this critical discussion
will provide attorneys with a comprehensive study of selected
case holdings and an analysis of how these decisions relate to previous Nebraska decisions, and allow our staff to critically compare
the resultant case law with that of other jurisdictions.
The cases discussed here were decided in the September term
1969 and the January term 1970, and update 49 Nebraska Law
Review 537 (1970), which analyzed the January term 1969.
This section does not include those cases which are or may
become the subjects of individual casenotes. Thus all recent important decisions are not contained herein. The Review welcomes
suggestions and criticism of the form and content of the section
from those interested in Nebraska law.
Douglas F. Duchek
Nebraska Editor
The subject areas and decisions discussed in this Nebraska Supreme Court Review are as follows:
I. Criminal Law*
A. Effective Waiver of Counsel
State v. Beasley, 184 Neb. 649, 171 N.W.2d 177 (1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 916 (1970).
B. Lineup and In-court Identification Problems
State v. Cannon, 185 Neb. 149, 174 N.W.2d 181 (1970).
C. Prejudicial Jury Instructions
State v. Garza 185 Neb. 445, 176 N.W.2d 664 (1970).
D. Probable Cause
State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 176 N.W.2d 21 (1970).
E. Right to a Speedy Trial
State v. Lee, 185 Neb. 184, 174 N.W.2d 344 (1970).
II. Real Property
A. State v. Bardsley, 185 Neb, 629, 177 N.W.2d 599 (1970) .**
B. Dewey v. Montessori Educational Center, Inc., 185 Neb.
791, 178 N.W.2d 792 (1970).***

C. Westbrook v. Masonic Manor, 185 Neb. 660, 178 N.W.2d
280 (1970).***
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III. Civil Procedure
A. Abbott v. Abbott, 185 Neb. 177, 174 N.W.2d 335 (1970).**
State ex rel. Sampson v. Kenny, 185 Neb. 230, 175 N.W.2d 5
(1970).**
C. Lydick v. Johns, 185 Neb. 717, 178 N.W.2d 581 (1970).***
D. Schmer v. Gilleland, 185 Neb. 54, 173 N.W.2d 391
(1970) .*:**
*Richard Kopf '72
"*Kenneth L. Noha '72
***Patrick T. O'Brien '72
I.
A. EFsc=iVn WAiv_

CRIMINAL LAW

Or COUNSEL

State v. Beasley, 184 Neb. 649, 171 N.W.2d 177 (1969),
denied, 399 U.S. 916 (1970).

cert.

Herbert Beasley was convicted in the District Court of Douglas
County for robbery,1 and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.
Beasley appealed the conviction on the basis that his waiver of
counsel was ineffective because he was mentally incompetent at
the time. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction 2
Defendant then filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence, which was denied. Beasley appealed and the
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed denial of the motion.s
This review will consider Beasley's second appeal. The principal
issue was whether the defendant had intelligently waived counsel.
The Beasley decision involves the court's treatment of psychiatric
evidence relating to competency to waive counsel, and the responsibility of the trial judge when deciding whether to accept a waiver
of counsel.
The defendant was represented by counsel at the preliminary
hearing, but subsequently refused further assistance of counsel and
insisted upon defending himself. The public defender suggested
that Beasley undergo a mental examination to determine if he
should be allowed to waive counsel. The trial court did not order
a mental examination, but it did appoint the public defender to
act as advisor. The defendant was convicted. On his first appeal,
1 See NE.

REv. STAT. § 28-414 (Reissue 1964).
2 State v. Beasley, 183 Neb. 681, 163 N.W.2d 783 (1969). See also Nebraska Supreme Court Review, 49 NEB. L. RsV. 537, 549-50 (1970).
3 State v. Beasley, 184 Neb. 649, 171 N.W.2d 177 (1969), cert. denied,
399 U. S. 916 (1970).
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Beasley argued that he had lacked sufficient mental capacity to
intelligently waive counsel. The Nebraska Supreme Court found
that the "record as a whole at this time does not show that the
defendant was mentally incompetent to refuse the assistance of
counsel."
Defendant then filed a motion for new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence. 5 This was denied and Beasley appealed. The
new evidence presented related to his mental competence. The
defendant was examined by a psychiatrist who concluded that he
was in a psychotic state at the time he refused assistance of counsel
and at the time of trial;6 the doctor also found the defendant to
be a paranoid schizophrenic who appeared normal in many respects.7 It was revealed that Beasley had a mental breakdown while
in the Ohio penitentiary and had been hospitalized for psychiatric
reasons while he was in the army.8 It was also learned that the
public defender had told the trial judge that: "There should probably be an examination to see if he is capable of defending himself."9

The Nebraska Supreme Court, upon a "review and consideration
of the entire record, including the evidence offered in support of
the motion for new trial for newly discovered evidence, ...",1 found
that Beasley was capable of intelligently waiving counsel. The
majority opinion concluded that the doctor's testimony was inherently weak because: "[H]is opinion relates to the condition of the
defendant 8 months previous to the examination."' The Nebraska
court found indications that Beasley was mentally competent and
had not been prejudiced by the lack of counsel. For example, the
court found that Beasley was no stranger to the courtroom and
that he was faced with an almost conclusive case against him. The
court also found that Beasley was competent enough to have had
certain evidence excluded during the trial.
First, the Beasley decision is important because of its treatment
of psychiatric evidence as that evidence related to the issue of
competency to waive counsel.
183 Neb. at 683-84, 163 N.W.2d at 785.
5 See Erwin v. Watson Bros. Transfer Co., 129 Neb. 64, 260 N.W. 565
(1935) and NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1142(7), -1143(2), -1144, -1145
(1935) (both relating to newly discovered evidence as a basis for
appeal).
6 Brief for Appellant at 10, State v. Beasley, 184 Neb. 649, 171 N.W.2d
177 (1969).
7 Id. at 8-9.
8 Id. at 6-7.
9 Id. at 12-13.
10 184 Neb. at 652, 171 N.W.2d at 179.
11 Id. at 651, 171 N.W.2d at 178.
4
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The court did not seriously consider the substantive material

contained in the doctor's testimony. By relying almost exclusively
on the time factor the court may have created extreme difficulty
in effectively raising the issue of competency after a waiver of
counsel has been accepted. The court placed its emphasis on the
fact that the testimony was based on a mental examination conducted eight months after the waiver, rather than balancing the
lateness issue with the substantive merits of the testimony.
Little attention was given to Beasley's continuous history of
mental illness. For example, the doctor testified:
I think his behavior under stress was haughty, rigid, he would not
listen to any type of counsel, and he says this, and strange as it may
seem, the psychologist points this out in his behavior at the Lima
State Hospital....12
Nor was any consideration given to the fact that Beasley was
diagnosed by the doctor as a paranoid schizophrenic, a disease often
characterized by delusions of persecution. Beasley had stated: "I
have money and I am no tramp but you got me looking that way.
I have dignity .... I look like a bum and I can't help myself and all
the time you want to throw a lawyer on me."'13 The apparent correlation between Beasley's statements and the doctor's testimony
could have rebutted the inference that the examination was faulty
due to its lateness.
It may be argued that the emphasis on the time factor with
regard to the mental examination makes possible unintelligent
waivers of counsel. For example, if the psychiatrist in Beasley was
correct and paranoid schizophrenics appear normal in most repects,24 but are incapable of defending themselves in court, then
it is entirely possible that such a defendant will be allowed to waive
counsel unintelligently. A defendant may appear normal to a trial
judge but in reality be incapable of critical judgment. Consequently,
after trial the defendant may be found to have made an irrational
choice due to his previously unknown incapacity. By emphasizing
the time factor and virtually ignoring evidence of incapacity the
court may well allow criminal defendants who suffer from some
mental aberration to refuse assistance of counsel.
12

Brief for Appellant at 27, State v. Beasley, 184 Neb. 649, 171 N.W.2d
177 (1969) (emphasis added).

13 Id. at 21.
14 Id. at 9. The psychiatrist stated: "There is usually in paranoid schizophrenia a pretty well preserved behavior pattern ....A person who
has this condition can appear normal in many respects." See also B.
MALOY, MEDICAL DIcTIOxARY FOR LAWvERs 548, 622 (3d ed. 1960).
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In a Michigan case similar in many respects to Beasley, a defendant charged with rape had pleaded guilty, waived counsel and was
examined some thirty days thereafter for a presentence report. 15
The defendant, who had appeared normal at the arraignment, was
diagnosed as a sociopath with strong feelings of hostility who would
take the path of least resistance and consequently refuse counsel in
order to end the proceedings and remove himself from stress. A
motion for new trial and withdrawal of the guilty plea was made
and denied. The Michigan court held the psychiatrist's affidavit
raised "bona fide doubt"' 6 as to competence and vacated the sentence with orders to rearraign. 7
The time factor in the Michigan case was much shorter than
that in Beasley. But the important aspect of the decision is that
the Michigan court looked to the merits of the psychiatric evidence
notwithstanding its ex post facto character. Perhaps the better
rule would be to balance the time factor with the merits of the
testimony. If a medical opinion raises a "bona fide" doubt as to
competency to waive counsel but for the ex post facto character
of the evidence, perhaps the integrity of the criminal justice system
warrants a careful weighing of both the merit and the timeliness
of the evidence.
Secondly, the Beasley decision is of interest because of the
manner in which the decision approaches the responsibility of the
trial court with regard to the defendant who wishes to waive assistance of counsel. The Nebraska Constitution provides that a defendant may represent himself.' 8 However, there is some question
whether the right to counsel under the United States Constitution
implies the opposite right to refuse counsel.' 9 The one thing that is
clear is that a defendant may only waive counsel intelligently. The
United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst ° suggested that
a trial court has a duty to insure that waivers of counsel are intelligently made. The Court stated:
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel
invokes, of itself, the protection of the trial court ....This protecting
15 People v. Russel, 20 Mich. App. 47, 173 N.W.2d 816 (1969).
16 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 385 (1966).
17 20 Mich. App. at 67-68, 173
18 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11:

N.W.2d -at 826.
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in person."

19 Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24 (1965), where a unanimous

20

Court rejected the contention that a defendant had a constitutional
right to refuse trial by jury, although guaranteed that right. But see
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S.269 (1942); United
States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
304 U. S.458 (1938).
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duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial
judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent
waiver....

21

Mr. Justice Black has argued that a trial judge must "investigate
as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before
him demand ...
.,,22 when confronted with a defendant's wish to
waive counsel. A California court expressed the same sentiment
in a different manner when it stated: "The court cannot accept a
waiver of counsel from anyone accused of a serious public offense
without first determining . . . the education, experience, mental
competence and conduct of the accused. .. ."
In Beasley the trial judge had been informed that the defendant
should undergo mental examination, yet he ignored the public
defender's suggestion and proceeded. The majority opinion did not
consider what the responsibility of the trial judge was with regard
to accepting the waiver.
It is possible, as the dissenting opinion in Beasley suggests, that
"[t]he majority opinion blinks at the neglect of inquiry when
inquiry would have been fruitful." 24 Even absent the trial judge's
normal "protecting duty," Beasley seems peculiar in that the trial
judge was forewarned of the need to examine the defendant. Thus
the decision appears to have relaxed the rule relating to acceptance
of waivers of counsel.
Realizing the Nebraska court's hesitance to attach significance
to retrospective determinations of incompetency to waive counsel,
perhaps the suggestion that the court might require a trial judge
to expend every effort to determine competency is not ill-founded.25
In terms of judicial economy and fairness, the extra time spent in
insuring that a waiver of counsel is intelligently made would be
well worthwhile.
21
22
23

24

25

Id. at 465. See also Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 150 (1966) (per
curiam).
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708, 723-24 (1948).
People v. Hardin, 207 Cal. App. 2d 336, 390, 24 Cal. Rptr. 563, 566
(Ct. App. 1962).
184 Neb. at 653, 171 N.W.2d at 179.

It should be pointed out that the trial judge did appoint the public
defender to act as an advisor to Beasley. The practice of appointing
an attorney to act as advisor was approved in State v. Walle, 182 Neb.
642, 156 N.W.2d 810 (1968). However, this practice should not be used
to circumvent the question of competency to waive counsel. See Note,
The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 MInI. L.
REV. 1133, 1152 (1965).
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As Justices Smith and McCown noted in dissent, the A.B.A.

Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services § 7.2 should be
adopted. That section provides:
The accused's failure to request counsel or his announced intention
to plead guilty should not itself be construed to constitute a waiver.
An accused should not be deemed to have waived the assistance of
counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry into the accused's comprehension of
that offer and his capacity to make the choice intelligently and understandably has been made. No waiver should be found to have

been made where it appears that the accused is unable to make an
intelligent and understanding choice because of his mental condition, age, education, 26experience, the nature and complexity of the
case or other factors.
B. LINEUP AND IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION PROBLEMS

State v. Cannon, 185 Neb. 149, 174 N.W.2d 181 (1970).

Fred Cannon was convicted of burglary in the District Court

of Adams County.27 While the defendant appealed on a number of
grounds, this review of State v. Cannon will only consider the question of the legality of an in-court identification subsequent to an
illegal lineup.
The facts relating to the above question are as follows: the
manager of a liquor store heard the sound of breaking glass and
proceeded to investigate. He observed a man coming through a
broken window. In front of the intruder was a bright light and
the manager observed the intruder from some twenty feet. The
intruder fled and the manager called the police. The police arrested
Cannon on the basis of the witness's description. At the time of the
arrest the defendant was dressed substantially in the manner
described by the manager.
At the trial the manager identified Cannon as the intruder. No
motion to suppress this evidence was made before or during the
trial. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited from the witness the statement that a short time after the arrest he identified
the defendant in the absence of defense counsel. It is not clear,
but apparently prior to the lineup the witness was shown five
photographs of black males, four of whom were known to him;

26
27

ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE
(emphasis added).
See NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-532 (Reissue 1964).

SERVICES §

7.2 (1967)
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the remaining man pictured was the defendant 28 Again, it is not
clear but the same five men apparently composed the lineup.2 9 The
state did not introduce evidence regarding the lineup.
The defendant did not raise as error in his motion for new trial
or in his assignment of error the question of the validity of the
in-court identification. However, due to its constitutional nature
the Nebraska Supreme Court considered the question. The court
suggested that since the defendant was aware of the prior illegal
lineup but failed to object to the in-court identification he would
normally be held to have waived the objection. The court stated:
"While we believe this rule to be a proper one, especially in a case
such as this, nevertheless, this case is not dependent upon the
adoption of such a rule."30
Parenthetically, the court's reaction to the failure of defense
counsel to object to the in-court identification appears to be dictum.
It does, however, provide a strong indication that the court may
rule that a defendant who fails to object to an in-court identification subsequent to an illegal lineup will be precluded from challenging the validity of the identification on appeal. The adoption
of such a rule would be understandable since it is premised on the
concept that the trial judge should be given an opportunity to
determine whether the prior illegal lineup "tainted" the subsequent
in-court identification. Perhaps, however, the court might recognize
that criminal defendants are often represented by appointed attorneys, as was the case in Cannon, who are unfamiliar with criminal
litigation. Consequently, the court might require trial courts, when
confronted with an apparent problem of identification testimony,
to inquire of the defense counsel, on the record, whether he wishes
31
to object.
With regard to the in-court identification, the Nebraska Supreme
Court appears to have taken a restrictive view of Wade v. United
Brief of Appellant at 6, 7, State v. Cannon, 185 Neb. 149, 174 N.W.2d
181 (1970). It was determined that during cross-examination the
"witness was shown a picture of five colored men and that [he] looked
at a lineup of five colored men .... It also became apparent that the
witness knew the other four colored men, the defendant being the
fifth man ... "
29 "Prior to the illegal lineup, he had viewed a picture of the defendant
and four other colored men. The four other colored men were known
to the witness. This was, therefore, in effect, a one-man lineup ...
"
185 Neb. at 152, 174 N.W.2d at 183.

28

30 Id.
31 See Solomon v. United States, 408 F.2d 1306, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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States.32 In the Wade case the United States Supreme Court held
that counsel must be present during the lineup to insure that it is
conducted properly 33 and that defense counsel will be able to
effectively argue the identification issue.3 4 Throughout, the Court
recognized and feared the possibility of misidentification because
of the suggestive nature of an improper lineup. 35 The Court concluded that the test to be used should determine
[wihether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by ex-

ploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint 3 6
The Wade Court recognized that a lineup may color a witness's
initial perception so that an in-court identification would be invalid.
Thus, it is not enough to find that the witness's observation of the
defendant prior to the lineup was reliable. The trial court should
also determine if the intervening lineup was suggestive to the point
that the witness would be incapable of making a trustworthy incourt identification.
The Nebraska Supreme Court characterized the lineup in
Cannon as a "one man lineup.13 7 The court did not, however, examine the import of that statement nor did they proceed to examine,
in depth, the manner in which the lineup was conducted. Rather,
the court argued that because the intruder was observed full face in
a bright light from some twenty feet, the in-court identification
was sufficiently reliable. The Cannon decision did not consider the
possibility that an improper lineup might alter a well formed original perception so as to make an in-court identification merely a
reflection of the bias instilled in the witness by the suggestive
lineup-hence an exploitation of the primary illegality. The following analysis is suggested.
First, the fact that the lineup in question was essentially a
one man affair indicates the possibility that a witness would be
unfairly influenced.88 Putting one man in front of a witness might
32 388 U. S. 218 (1967).

See Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967);

Note, The Right to Counsel DuringPretrialIdentificationProceedings
-An Examination, 47 NEB. L. REv. 740 (1968).
33 388 U.S. at 23.
34 Id at 231, 232.
35 Id at 228.
36 Id at 241.
37 185 Neb. at 152, 174 N.W.2d at 183.
38 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1968) (where the Court recognized the undesirability of a one man confrontation); Bigger v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 408 (1968) (per curiam) (Black, J., dissenting);
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969). See also WALL, EYE-
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strongly indicate to him that the police have found their man.
The witness might conclude that the police, because they placed
one man in a lineup, thought the suspect fit the witness's description; consequently, the witness might feel he should agree rather
than contradict his own description. For example, a witness was
once asked whether the man he had identified fit the previous
description. He answered: "Oh you certainly would not have
brought him here if he were not the right man."39 A one man lineup
simply does not test the witness. Conversely, it graphically indicates
the answer desired by the police.
Second, there were photographs shown to the witness prior to
the lineup. The use of photographs was unnecessary because the
defendant was in custody and available for observation. Since one
of the photographs was of the defendant, the use of that picture
could have been highly suggestive.4 0 This would be compounded
if the other four men were known to the witness. In addition,
since only five photographs were used this may have been an
inadequate basis for a fair test of the witness's ability to make
an identification. 41 In short, the use of the photographs could have
reinforced in the witness's mind the suggestion that the police had
found their man. It has been suggested that
[b]ecause of the inherent limitations of photography, which presents
its subject in two dimensions rather than the three dimensions of
reality, and which presents a "frozen" image . . . witnesses should
be asked to examine photographs only where proper corporeal identification is impossible... 42
CAMrON IN CMMnINAL CASES, 26, 40 (1965). See generally Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 ComT.
L. Q. 391 (1933).
39 GRoss, CRnVmTmA PSYCHOLOGY 36-37 (1911).
40 "Equally serious can be the effect of showing a photograph of a particular suspect to a witness with questions whether he recognizes the
man, if the same witness is afterwards to be confronted with this man
at the parade. Subsequent identification of the accused shows nothing
except the picture was a good likeness. The same objection applies,
though in a reduced degree, where the witness has actually picked out
this particular man from a whole series of photographs." Williams &
Hummelmann, Identification Parades-I, 1963 Canw. L. REv. 479, 484.
See also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1967); Comment,
Photographic Identification: The Hidden Persuader, 56 IowA L. REV.
408 (1970). Cf. Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1966).
41 See WALL, supra note 38, at 77 ("qn England the usual number is eight
or ten, and this number may be the minimum required by police
regulations.").
WITNEss IDEN

42 Id. at 70. See also United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305, 1308 (3d Cir.

1970) ("In order for such in-court identifications to be admissible the
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Third, presumably the witness was a white man.43 The witness's
identification of a black man may therefore be suspect. Situations
where white men identify black men have been deemed to indicate
the possibility of misidentification:
In general, there is a much greater possibility of error where the
races are different than where they are the same. Where they are
different, there is more likelihood of error where the suspect belongs
to a minority group and the witness to a majority group .... 44
The police could well have capitalized on the possibility of error
by placing, in effect, a lone black man in the lineup. The police,
realizing that the witness would be unable to discriminate effectively among a panel of blacks not known to him, could have obviated the necessity of making a discerning choice by simply
placing one black man in the panel. Once the possibility of confusion had been negated by putting Cannon alone in the lineup
it may then have become impossible for the witness to make any
other subsequent identification.
Had the Cannon court examined the manner in which the lineup
was conducted and found it to be suggestive, the court would then
have had to determine if the witness would have been able to disregard the conditioning inspired by the lineup so as to be able
to make an accurate in-court identification. However, the Cannon
decision did not seriously consider the possibility that the lineup
affected the witness's initial perception. What the court ignored
was the distinct possibility that an improper lineup would distort
the witness's previous mental picture. The Wade Court recognized
that "[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness
has picked out the accused at a lineup, he is not likely to go back
on his word .... -45 While the witness may have had ample opportunity to make an identification independent of the lineup, the
insertion of an improper lineup might have altered his original
perception of the intruder. 46 For example, as one commentator has
suggested:

43

government must 'establish by clear and convincing evidence' that the
witnesses were not influenced by the prior improper photographic
confrontations.").
The court referred to members of the black race as being colored.
See note 29 supra. Therefore, the absence of such a denotation may be
construed as meaning the person referred to was white.
See WALL, supra note 38, at 122.

44
45 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967).
46

See State v. Redmond, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 64, 67, 448 P.2d 938, 940 (1968)
(psychologist testified that an untainted in-court identification made
subsequent to an illegal lineup was impossible).
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A determination that the witness can make an in-court identifica-

tion on the basis of his original mental picture, unaffected by manipulative practices at the lineup, is probably ill-founded. The processes
of perception and identification do not operate in such a manner.
For legal analysis to comport with psychological theory, the inquiry
must be into how much the in-court identification was affected by
the lineup. 47

The Cannon decision fails to realize the malleability of the
human mind. It is submitted that a determination of the reliability
of the witness's original observation is not solely adequate. The
court should then proceed to determine whether the illegal lineup
could have significantly altered the initial perception. The Nebraska
court's failure to probe the manner in which the lineup was conducted leaves the essential question in Wade unanswered-was the
primary illegality of the lineup exploited?
C. PnsEnmiCIAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS

State v. Garza, 185 Neb. 445, 176 N.W.2d 664 (1970).
Steven Garza was convicted in the District Court of Cass County
of stabbing with intent to kill, wound or maim.48 The principal issue
on appeal was whether a supplemental instruction abridged the
defendant's right to trial by jury.49 The Garza decision analyzes
the fundamental problem of separation of function and power
between trial judge and jury.
The jury in Garza's trial returned a guilty verdict after a supplemental instruction. Shortly before the jury returned the verdict
the trial judge received a note from the jury foreman which read:
"We are at 11 to 1 since 8:00 last night. There is no hope of change.
What shall we do? Boyd Clements, Foreman."50 The trial judge
then asked the foreman if he believed that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked or if there was any reasonable chance of the jury
arriving at a verdict. After the foreman answered that the jury was
47 Note, Criminal Procedure-Right to Counsel: Independence of InCourt Identification of Criminal Defendant from Previous Lineup
IdentificationInadmissible Due to Absence of Counsel-State v. Redmond 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 64, 448 P.2d 938 (1968), 45 WAsH. L. REv. 202,

209 (1970).

See NEB. RE.v. STAT. § 28-410 (Reissue 1964).
49 NEB. CONsT. art. 1, § 11. See U. S. CONST. amend. VI. See also Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to a jury trial in serious

48

criminal cases must be respected by the states under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

50 Brief for Appellant at 10, State v. Garza, 185 Neb. 445, 176 N.W.2d
664 (1970).
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indeed hopelessly deadlocked, the trial judge instructed the jury
as follows:
Well, of course, I recognize and appreciate the fact that you have
been out now for better than 15 hours, but in justice to all the parties,
the State, and society, and the defendant, I feel, especially in view of
the fact that the vote is now 11 to 1, that this case should be disposed
of by your verdict, and it is certainly my earnest hope and, likewise,
my firm belief that this can be accomplished. And, especially in view
of the fact that the vote is 11 to 1, I just can't be convinced that there
is no possibility of your agreeing. I certainly have every confidence

in our jury system and I've got every confidence in you ladies and
gentlemen as jurors in this case, and I am going to ask you again to
retire to your jury room and I'm going to ask you to earnestly renew your efforts to come to a verdict in this case. And I will check

with you later on again this afternoon. Thank you very much. 51

The defendant moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the
supplemental instruction was prejudicial, but the motion was denied. Less than an hour after the supplemental instruction was
given the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
The Nebraska Supreme Court characterized the instruction as
an "Allen charge" 52 and reversed and remanded. Citing Potard v.
State,5 3 the court found the language contained therein "sufficiently
broad to cover the rejection of any genuine Allen-type instruction.

' 54

The court added:

We are not inclined to approve the Allen-type instruction, but
rather, to adhere to the rule found in Potard v. State, supra. We do
believe that the rule advanced in United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d
930 (7th Cir., 1969), is consistent with our present rule and merits
approval. This rule requires compliance with section 5.4 of the ABA
Standards Relating to Trial by Jury .... 5
51 185 Neb. at 446, 176 N.W.2d at 665 (emphasis added by court).
52 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
53 140 Neb. 116, 119-20, 299 N.W. 362, 364 (1941): "Any attempt by the
court to encourage a verdict will be seized upon by the majority as a
coercive argument against the minority, especially if the minority be
small. Such a situation does not meet the constitutional requirements
of a speedy, public trial by impartial jury...
54 185 Neb. at 448, 176 N.W.2d at 666.
55 Id. See United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933-34 (7th Cir. 1969)
(emphasis added): "We have concluded that it would serve the interests of justice to require under our supervisory power that, in the
future, district courts within this Circuit when faced with deadlocked
juries comply with the standards suggested by the American Bar Association's Trial by Jury publication. These standards specifically
provide: . . . (a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court

may give an instruction which informs the jury: (i) that in order to
return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; (ii) that jurors have
a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
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Jury trials that result in "hung" juries are not uncommon.56
Nor is the eccentric juror who prompts the jury foreman to request "eleven dinners and a bale of hay" an uncommon phenomenon.5 7 While the hung jury is commonplace, the attempts of trial
judges to pressure deadlocked jurors is no less commonplace. The
problem of the deadlocked jury places the trial judge in the unenviable position of allowing the judicial system, the litigants, and
the public to be confronted with yet another time consuming, cost
producing, and generally exhausting trial. Needless to say, trial
judges motivated with good intentions attempt to insure that the
juries will not "hang." For example, a judge apparently not acquainted with the word "subtlety" told a jury: "Don't you undertake to fool me by coming out and saying that you agreed to a
mistrial. I would dislike to send such a good looking body of men
to jail, and that is what I would have to do."58 In America, giving
supplemental instructions to coax a verdict out of a deadlocked
jury predates the Civil War. 9 The culmination of judicial attempts
to enforce the concept of unanimity among jurors found fruition
in Allen v. United States, 60 when the United States Supreme Court

56

57

58

59

60

reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment; (iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself,
but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his
fellow jurors; (iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should
not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion if
convinced it is erroneous; and (v)that no juror should surrender his
honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely
because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose
of returning a verdict. (b) If it appears to the court that the jury has
been unable to agree, the court may require the jury to continue their
deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in
subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require the
jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals."
See H. KALvE & H. ZEisEL, THE Aminrcmx Juwy 453 (1966): "[I]n
terms of sheer numbers, the hung jury is an important phenomenon,
since more than 5 per cent of all juries, or some 3000 trials per year,
end in such mistrials."
See Hammer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 281 (9th Cir. 1958).
Fairey v. Haynes, 107 S.C. 115, 91 S.E. 976 (1917). See Mead v. City
of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 537, 297 N.W. 419 (1941) (judge threatened to turn off the water and heat in the jury room). See also 1 W.
BLAcESTONE, ComMNTmpns 375 (Sharswood ed. 1865): "And it has
been held, that if the jurors do not agree on their verdict before the
judges are about to leave town.., the judges are not bound to wait
for them, but may carry them round the circuit from town to town
in a cart."
Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass.1 (1851).
164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). The Court paraphrased the instructions given
by the trial judge as follows: "[T]hat in a large proportion of cases
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upheld the now famous "Allen" charge or, more colorfully, the
"dynamite charge."
The Allen charge has met with a great deal of criticism.8 1 It is
argued that the charge coerces jurors who are in disagreement with
the majority of their fellow jurors. As at least two states have suggested, the Allen charge may be inherently coercive.6 2 The evil is,
of course, that the defendant is thereby denied his constitutional
right to trial by jury.6 3 The argument is simply that an accused is
entitled to have his fate decided by men and women who are free
from outside influence. As the court stated in United States v.
Harris:64 "The possibility of disagreement by the jury and the
lack of a unanimous verdict is a protection conferred upon a defendant in a criminal case by the Constitution .... - A jury may decide
absolute certainty could not be expected; that although the verdict
must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the
question submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to decide
the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen,
with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that,
if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror
should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made
no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally
intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might
not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not
"
concurred in by the majority....
61 E.g., Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 756 (5th Cir.) (Brown,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962). Judge Brown found
an expanded Allen charge based upon irrelevant considerations, such
as: a duty to decide and settle; a decision means much to the parties;
it will not be easier for a different jury; the expense to the government; the inconvenience to the judge and others; the cost to taxpayers; the jurors' delays keep lawyers from other work; unless a
decision is made all work must be done over; judges must courageously decide facts, so must the jury.
62 See State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 166, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959); State
v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 542, 353 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1960). See also
United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Fivorvanti, 412 F.2d 407, 420 (3d Cir. 1969); United States
v. Thomas, 8 Cpim. L. REP. 2141 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1970).
63 Cf. H. KAIvEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 56, at 463. The authors point out
that a member of a group in an ambiguous situation will doubt and
finally disbelieve his own correct observations if all other members
of the group claim that he must have been mistaken.
64 391 F.2d 348 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874 (1968).
65 Id at 355. Cf. Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965).
(Judge's statement to a deadlocked jury, "You have got to reach a
decision in this case," prejudicial and incorrect).
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to do three different things: find against the defendant, find for
the defendant, or decide not to decide, and arguably, the defendant
is entitled to any one of the three findings. The Allen charge may
limit the alternatives to two.
The Garza court was not faced with a classic Allen charge,
although the court found the instruction Allen-like. The classic
Allen charge contains, at least nominally, an admonition to the
jurors not to agree for the sake of agreement.6 6 The Garza charge
did not caution the jurors that the verdict must be a statement of
each individual juror's convictions. In addition, the Garza charge
stated that a verdict "should" and "can" be arrived at. The Nebraska
court, however, did not address itself to the differences. The overriding concern was apparently that even a charge containing cautionary phrases is likely to influence the jury.
Unlike other courts who have done away with Allen-like charges
on supervisory grounds, 67 the Nebraska Supreme Court has rested
the Garza decision on constitutional grounds.6 s The essence of the
court's finding is embodied in Mr. Justice Holmes's statement that
the "conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by outside influence .... ,69 Realizing that a jury is extremely sensitive to outside
influence the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that the Garza
instruction "was tantamount to telling the dissenting juror that
he was wrong. The prestige of the court was used to bring him into
line with his fellow jurors ....
-70 Explicitly it appears that the
constitutional basis of Garza is jury sanctity in the fact finding
process. 71 Implicitly the rationale for the Garza decision would seem
66 See note 60 supra.

See United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Fivorvanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Thomas, 8 Cmr. L. REP. (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1970); State v. Thomas,
86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534,
353 P.2d 1054 (1960).
68 185 Neb. at 449, 176 N.W.2d at 666: "[The charge] presented a clear
invasion of the rights of the jury and prevented the defendant from
67

having his fate determined by an impartial and uncoerced jury." But
see United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1969): "No
court has held that the Allen instruction itself is unconstitutional. ...
69 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
70 185 Neb. at 449, 176 N.W.2d at 667. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309, 349 (1914) (Holmes, J., dissenting): "Any judge who has sat with
juries knows that in spite of forms they are extremely likely to be
impregnated by the environing atmosphere."
71 Cf. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (bailiffs influencing the
jury was grounds for reversal); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966) (pretrial and trial publicity held potentially coercive); Turner
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to be that the criminal process administered by judges needs to
be checked, in most cases, by the sense of lay persons.
From the standpoint of judicial economy the Garza decision
may well have a salutary affect. As an Arizona court remarked in
rejecting use of the Allen charge: "It has given, and we believe
each use will give us, harassment and distress in the administration
of justice .... 72 When the Allen charge is utilized the appellate
court is forced to examine a number of vexatious problems. 73 By
doing away with the Allen charge the Nebraska court has saved
time consuming appeals and protected the sanctity of the jury.
However, ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury § 5.4,
adopted by the Garza decision, leaves certain questions unanswered.
For example, while the ABA Standards announce that the court
must not force the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of
time,7 4 the determination of "unreasonableness" would seem difficult.7 5 How long may the judge force the jury to deliberate at one

time?70 May the judge inform the jury how much longer the jury
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (two sheriff's deputies who appeared
as witnesses were charged with the duty of driving the jurors to and
from their quarters and had also eaten with the jurors; held that the
close association of the witnesses with the jury could have prejudicially swayed the jury).
72 State v. Thomas, 65 Ariz. 161, 166, 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959).
73 Compare Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 946 (1963) (25 minutes, affirmed) with Wissel v.
United States, 22 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1927) (25 minutes, reversed) for
an example of difficulty the courts have had in determining the
relevance of the speed with which a jury returns a verdict after the
Allen charge, as an indicator of prejudice. See Paschen v. United
States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1934) for an example of the difficulty in
determining whether the Allen charge was invoked too quickly. See
Lias v. United States, 51 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1931) for an example of the
problems of frying to determine if an Allen charge was prejudicial
when the case against the defendant was conclusive. See Anderson v.
United States, 262 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1959) for an example of the problem of determining the relevance of the judge's knowledge of the
numerical split before invoking the Allen charge.
174 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JuRy § 5.4 (1967).
75 Cf. Shaffer v. State, 123 Neb. 121, 242 N.W. 364 (1932) (length of time
for jury deliberation is within the discretion of the court); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1117 (Reissue 1964): "The jury may be discharged by the
court . . . after they have been kept together until it satisfactorily
16

appears that there is no probability of their agreeing."
Compare Commonwealth v. Clark, 404 Pa. 143, 170 A.2d 847 (1961)
(forced deliberations of 11 hours at one time held coercive) with commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157 A.2d 65 (1959) (forced deliberations of 11 hours at one time held not coercive). But see State v.
Stuchardt, 18 Neb. 454, 25 N.W. 722 (1885) (discharging jury after 11
hours held to be an abuse of discretion).
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will have to deliberate? 77 Is the giving of any supplemental instruc-

tion coercive?
Perhaps the better solution would be to accept the word of the
jury when it has reached an impasse. Present information sug-

gests that most jurors are conscientious.7 8 Sending a jury back to
deliberate after they have become deadlocked, even with a careful admonition that each juror should abide by his own convictions, may be coercive.7 9 The wear of time and the passions of the
jury room might well overcome a minority juror after he has been
told, in effect, that the judge is not yet ready to accept his decision. Thus, since most failures to reach verdicts are the consequence
of genuine disputes, and not attempts to shirk responsibility, the
best procedure may be to allow the jury to agree to disagree, without subtly prodding them to reach agreement.
In conclusion, society's need for reasonably quick adjudications
of criminal matters is clear. But as the Garza court realized, time
saving, on balance, does not overcome the need for an unshackled

jury.
D. PROBABLE CAUSE
State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 176 N.W.2d 21 (1970).
Larry LeDent was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotic
marijuana.80 The principal issue on appeal was whether the search
warrant affidavit in question was sufficient to establish probable
cause to issue a search warrant.
The defendant was arrested and the defendant's residence
searched after he had allegedly spoken to a man by the name of
Schiern about the possible sale of narcotics on November 1, 1968.
Schiern had been arrested after his talk with the defendant;
Schiern thereupon informed on the defendant. The following affidavit was executed on November 4, 1968:
77 Compare Wishard v. State, 5 Okla. Crim. 610, 115 P.2d 796 (1911)
with Butler v. State, 185 Tenn. 686, 207 S.W.2d 584 (1948).
78 Cf. H. KAvma
& H. Zissm, supra note 56, at 429-30. If judges are any
indication, the authors found that judges were critical of juries less
than 10 percent of the time.
79 There may be some support for allowing juries to "hang" without
giving a supplemental instruction. Potard,cited as the controlling case
in Garza; stated: "Any attempt by the court to encourage a verdict
will be seized upon by the majority as a coercive argument against
the minority . . . ." 140 Neb. at 119, 299 N.W. at 362.
80

See generally NEB.

REV. STAT.

§ 28-470 (Supp. 1969).
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(T)hat the said Larry LeDent is a resident of the above address and
is the son of the registered title holder; that a reliable informant related to the investigative authorities the said Larry LeDent has
offered to the said reliable informant certain narcotic drugs for resale; that on Friday, November 1, 1968, the said Larry LeDent told
the said reliable informant that he had fifty (50) lids of marijuana
available and also a homemade brick of grass available for resale
and that he knows the reliable informant knows that the narcotics
are kept at the residence at 13450 Frederick Street, Omaha, Douglas
County, Nebraska ....The reliable informant has given your affiant
other information that coincides with information received from
other reliable sources. Said reliable informant's information has been
verified and that information received has been the truth. The said
Larry LeDent is now charged under an information charging him
with possession of depressant or stimulant drugs in a separate incident.81
The Nebraska Supreme Court stated that a search warrant
affidavit based on an informant's tip must contain some of the circumstances underlying the informant's belief that the narcotics are
located where he claims and some of the circumstances from which
the officer concluded the informant was credible. The court then
characterized the affidavit as one which complied marginally with
constitutional requirements. It may therefore be concluded that
the affidavit in question established a minimum standard. The face
of the affidavit8 2 will be examined to determine the merit of the
standard which it establishes.
In general, a search warrant may only issue on the basis of
an affidavit which establishes the grounds for the warrant.83 Among
other things, a warrant may issue to search and seize property
possessed in violation of any law of Nebraska making such possession a criminal offense.8 4 Most importantly, a warrant may only
issue upon probable cause; 5 however, hearsay evidence may provide the probable cause necessary for the issuance of a search warrant.8 6 Probable cause may be defined as "the practical considerations of every day life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
87
legal technicians, act."
Brief of Appellant at 13-14, State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 176 N.W.2d
21 (1970).
82 Cf. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487 (1957), where the
Court stated that "the issue of probable cause had to be determined
•.. on the face of the complaint."
83 See NEB. REv.STAT. § 29-814 (Reissue 1964).
84 See NEB. REV.STAT. § 29-813 (Reissue 1964).
85 U. S. CONST. amend. IV; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
81

86 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
87

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

The leading case with regard to hearsay evidence as a basis for
probable cause to issue a search warrant is Spinelli v. United
States.88 The essence of the Spinelli rationale is that a judge and
not a police officer must make the decision to issue a search warrant. As the Court stated, that decision must be made by "a 'neutral
and detached magistrate' and not by 'the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' "89 Consequently, if the judge is to make the decision to issue a search warrant he must be given specific information on which to act, not
generalizations, conclusions, or speculation. Thus, the Spinelli Court
reaffirmed its support of Aguilar v. Texas, 0 in which the principle
was established that a search warrant affidavit must provide the
magistrate with reasons to believe the informant is reliable and
obtained his information in a reliable manner.9 1 It should also be
noted that Spinelii recognized that the issuing judge may evaluate
the affidavit by a common sense analysis of the entire affidavit, but
the Court cautioned that the "totality of the circumstances" approach should not be used to circumvent the question of reliability.92 The search warrant affidavit must be specific enough that
the judge will be able to determine probable cause.
An analysis of the LeDent affidavit should first entail an examination of the issue of the reliability of the informant. Aside from
the informant's specific description of the illicit goods, there was
nothing concrete contained in the affidavit to establish that the
informant was reliable. The affiant described the informant as
"reliable" without giving any indication why he drew this conclusion.9 3 The affiant suggested that the informant had given "other"
information 4 which coincided with information from "other reliable sources." However, what information was received from the
other sources was not specified, nor were the "other reliable sources"
specified or shown in fact to be reliable. The affiant added that the
88 393 U.S. 410 (1969).

89 393 U.S. at 415, (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14

(1948)).
90 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

91 Id. at 114.
92 393 U.S. at 415.
93 The Spinelli Court indicated that the use of the word "reliable" by
the affiant in describing the informant was of no value in establishing the "reliability" of the informer. Id. at 416. See also United States
v. Hood, 422 F.2d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 1970) (Will, J., dissenting); Gaston v. State, 440 S.W.2d 297, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (Onion, J.,
concurring).
94 See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303 (1967) for an example of
the quality of "other" information found to indicate the present reliability of the informant.
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informant's information was verified without explaining how the
verification was performed.
To exceed the minimum standard of LeDent the affiant wishing to establish the reliability of an informant might elaborate with
regard to the following: 9 5 the period of time the officer has dealt
with the informer; the reputation of the informer; whether the
informant was then subject to prosecution or had previously been
granted immunity; whether the informant had previously given
information which resulted in convictions based upon the information given (for example, if the information pertains to narcotics
then the conviction should relate to narcotics and not some unrelated offense); whether the informant observed the illicit goods
in their location or concluded that the goods were where he alleged
them to be on the basis of some other information; and whether
in the case of narcotics the informer is an addict.
Secondly, an analysis of the LeDent affidavit should consider
reliability as that issue pertains to the informant's information.
The affidavit in question indicated that the informant's information was specific with regard to the character of the illicit goods.
In addition, the afflant indicated that the informant's information
was three days old; therefore it was timely.96
However, the affidavit did not indicate that the informer told
the afflant his tale. If the affiant had no personal knowledge of the
informant's statements but was relying on other "investigative
authorities," then the problem of predicating probable cause on
the basis of hearsay on top of hearsay might be involved. 97 In addition, the affidavit related that LeDent had been charged with possession of narcotics in a separate incident; it is doubtful that this
fact had any relevance.9 8 What is of greater interest, however, is the
95 See generally Quinn, McCray v. Illinois: Probable Cause and the Informer Privilege,45 Dm. L. J. 399, 407 (1968).
96 Cf. United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712, 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 850 (1960); Mascolo, Staleness of Probable Cause in Affidavits
for Search Warrants:Resolving the Issue of Timeliness, 43 CONN. B. J.
189 (1969).
97 Cf., e.g., Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288, 291 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 927, rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 914 (1954), where the court held
that testimony of a field representative with regard to certain research
conducted by interviewers other than himself amounted to hearsay
within hearsay and was not therefore competent to prove the community was biased against the defendant. The question becomes: how
far can the witness be removed from the declarant and still provide
an accurate account of the declarant's statements?
98 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1969), where the
fact that Spinelli was a "known" gambler was held to be of no significance.
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fact that the affidavit did not give any information indicating that
the informant knew where the illicit goods were located except
the affiant's assertion that he "knew" that the informant "knew"
the location of the narcotics 9 Thus, the most important part of
the affidavit, the location of the illicit goods, was established without one specific fact to buttress the affiant's conclusion.
The affiant wishing to exceed the LeDent standard, with regard
to establishing the reliability of an informant's information, might
demonstrate the following. The affidavit should establish that the
affiant has personal knowledge of the informant's information. 0 0
And most importantly, the affidavit should clearly establish why
the informant concluded that the contraband was located where
the informant said it was.
In conclusion, the LeDent standard appears to be continuing
the practice of minimal participation by judges in the decision to
issue a search warrant.' 0 ' As Professors LaFave and Remington
have remarked:
[Alppellate court insistence ... on maximum judicial participation
in the decision to issue process ... is aimed at preventing unconstitutional arrests and searches. Judicial review of law enforcement
decisions is also premised upon prevention. In current practice,
however,.., the goal of prevention is not being achieved.10 2
The fact that the Nebraska court approved a search warrant affidavit which failed to show why the police "knew" where the
sought-after goods were located may indicate that the LeDent
minimum standard is too low. The viability of the right of privacy
in Nebraska may dictate that the LeDent minimum standard be
increased.

99 It is difficult to see the connection between a description of illicit
goods, based upon a conversation, and the location of the goods. Cf.
W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DEcISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
43 (1965). Professor LaFave suggests that observed "buys" do not
"afford probable cause to believe the seller has a cache of narcotics
in his apartment."

100 At least some indication should be given why the affiant believes the
person who told him of the informant's tale is credible. Cf. PRoPosE6
RULES or EVmENcE FOR THE UNTED STATES DiSTRICT COURTS AND
MAGIsTRATES 8-05 (Preliminary Draft 1969).
101 See W. LAFAVE, supra note 99, at 34-46 n. 57, where a judge signed
a warrant without examining it and handed it back to a pleased police
officer, the whole transaction taking place in a hallway.
102 LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in
Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 Mmc. L. REV.
987, 1011 (1965).
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E. RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
State v. Lee, 185 Neb. 184, 174 N.W.2d 344 (1970).
The defendant was convicted of breaking and entering a gasoline station with the intent to steal property of value. 0 3 The principal issue on appeal was whether he had been denied a speedy
04
trial.
Lee, an eighteen year old youth, was confined in jail for 311
days prior to trial. He was without counsel for 268 days. The
prosecution had objected to the appointment of counsel because defendant's parents were able to provide counsel; however, they chose
not to do so. Some six months after the first denial of appointed
counsel the defendant filed a written application for appointment
of counsel. Some eight months after this first request, the trial
court granted the application. Since the resident trial judge was
unable to hear the case, it was heard by nonresident trial judges.
Soon after his appointment, defense counsel moved for dismissal
on the grounds that his client had been denied a speedy trial and
due process. The motion was denied and trial was had forty-three
days from the time of appointment of counsel.
In a per curiam decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court modified
sentence but affirmed the conviction. The judges favoring affirmance found that Lee was tried within the statutory time, that he
had not explicitly demanded a speedy trial, that he had not been
prejudiced and had not been the subject of a purposeful failure
by the court or prosecution to afford a speedy trial.
Although the court noted that the defendant had been tried
within the statutory time, 0 5 the provision is merely a maximum
time for prosecution' 6 and should not be used to determine the
question of denial of the right to a speedy trial within the time
period. It is not clear exactly what weight was given to the fact
103 See generally NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-532

104 See Klopfer v.

105

(Reissue 1964).
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967),

applying the

Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial to the states. See also NEB.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 11 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to... a speedy trial....").
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1202 (Reissue 1964) ("If any person indicted
for any offense and committed to prison shall not be brought to trial
before the end of the second term of the court having jurisdiction of
the offense, which shall be held after such indictment found, he shall
be entitled to be discharged, so far as relates to the offense for which
he was committed, unless the delay shall happen on the application
of the prisoner.").

106 See Maher v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 475, 13 N.W.2d 641, 649 (1944).
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that the defendant was tried within the statutory maximum. However, there is some indication that the court was hesitant to consider the speedy trial issue when trial had taken place within the
statutory period.1 07 In addition, the time period was found to vary
from county to county. Thus, it is entirely possible that the right to
a speedy trial may be determined by which county brings the litigation. 0 8
The Lee court also found that the defendant had not "demanded
or requested a speedy trial or made any effort to obtain a speedier
trial."1 09 Therefore, it seems the court followed what has been
known as the "demand" doctrine.11"0 As far as the defendant is concerned, the consequence of the demand doctrine is that lack of an
explicit request for a speedy trial will be construed as an indication
that the defendant approves of the delay. The demand doctrine is
premised on the concept that delays benefit defendants.-"
The rationale of the demand doctrine is of dubious quality.112
Specifically, with regard to the Lee case the doctrine had no utility
since the defendant did not have legal counsel and was not free
on bail. A delay could not have been to his benefit since there was
no defense counsel to utilize the extra time in preparation for trial.
185 Neb. at 195, 174 N.W.2d at 350. At least those judges who found
a denial of the right to a speedy trial found it necessary to stress that
the statutory time was merely a "maximum."
108 Id. at 194, 174 N.W.2d at 349, where Justice McCown, joined by Justices Spencer and Smith noted the need for legislative attention to
this matter. Apparently the legislature was listening when it passed
L.B. 436, 81st Neb. Leg. Sess. (1971): "If any person indicted for any
offense and committed to prison shall not be brought to trial within
six months, he shall be entitled to be discharged, so far as relates to
the offense for which he was committed, unless the delay shall happen
on the application of the prisoner .... If any person indicted for any
offense, who has given bail for his appearance, shall not be brought
to trial within six months, he shall be entitled to be discharged, so far
as relates to such offense, unless the delay shall happen on his application, or be occasioned by the want of time to try such cause within
six months." See also Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57
COL. L. REv. 846, 863, 864 & n. 117 (1957); ABA STs'-Dmms RELATING
TO SPEEDY TRiAL § 2.2 (Tentative Draft 1967).
109 185 Neb. at 191, 174 N.W.2d at 348.
110 See Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REv.476, 478 (1968).
"I See United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir.
1963) ("Such a rule is based on the almost universal experience that
a delay in criminal cases is welcomed by defendants as it usually operates in their favor.") (Footnote omitted).
112 See Comment, Waiver of the Right to a Speedy Trial, 5 CALIF. WEST.
L. REv. 76, 82 (1968). See also ABA STmnARns RELATING TO SPEEDY
TRiAL § 2.2 (Tentative Draft 1967).
107
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Nor could the defendant use the extra time for such things as earning money to pay for his defense, since he was incarcerated.
While the Nebraska Supreme Court appears to be following
the weight of authority, 113 the effect of the demand doctrine is to
presume waiver of a constitutional right. Therefore, the continuing
vitality of the doctrine is in doubt. With regard to the right to a
speedy trial, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
The history of the right to a speedy trial and its reception in this
country clearly establish that it is one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.114
With regard to waiver of constitutional rights, the Court has
argued:
There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights
and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established
that there was "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege.""15
Whatever the utility of the demand doctrine, it appears that Lee
did his best to "demand," that is, filing a written application for
appointment of counsel after a prior oral application. Arguably,
the youth did what most reasonable men would do when confronted
with a lengthy period of incarceration prior to trial-he sought legal
assistance. The Nebraska court gave a strong indication that the
demand doctrine would be applied literally when it chose not to
construe Lee's application for counsel as a request for a speedy
trial.
The court also found that the defendant had not been prejudiced
by his pre-trial confinement. 1 6 However, two factors which would
tend to indicate prejudice are suggested.
"3

114

115

See United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1057 (1968), where the court stated that the demand
doctrine "has been consistently applied in a constantly lengthening
line of cases."
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1965) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,

304 U.S. 458, (1938)). See generally Tigar, Foreward; Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. Ray. 1 (1970).
116 185 Neb. at 191, 174 N.W.2d at 348 (1970): "We find a want of pre-

judice to the defendant since the trial court made it clear that the
time spent in jail awaiting trial was given full consideration at the
time sentence was passed." However Justices McCown, Spencer and
Smith found no statutory authority for the trial judge to credit jail
time on the sentence. And they also found that if defendant were to
serve the one year sentence, minus credit for good time while serving
it, he would be released in less time than he spent in jail prior to
trial. Id. at 197, 174 N.W.2d at 351.
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First, Lee was without counsel for 268 days. Although it was
not argued, it may be assumed that the defense counsel had a
difficult time reconstructing the events which led to the charge.
The defendant may have been unable to remember relevant facts
to aid counsel in preparation for trial.1 7 It is obvious that defense
counsel could not argue and prove facts which the defendant had
forgotten.
Second, there is little doubt that the defendant suffered anxiety.
The fact that the defendant was young, never before in jail, and
left virtually without counsel, legal or otherwise, would seem to
increase dramatically the possibility and level of anxiety. The
United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that the
right to a speedy trial exists, among other reasons, "to minimize
' 8
anxiety.""
It is of interest that one judge in Lee saw the anxiety
issue quite differently when he argued that "[u]ndue incarceration
before trial and concern over public accusation would be very material to an innocent person wrongfully accused, but scarcely so to
one who is guilty .. ."119
It would seem then that only those acquitted could claim prejudice because of anxiety due to lengthy pre-trial incarceration. Such
a construction would prohibit the proof of prejudice because of
anxiety. Only those convicted would have a forum, that is, appeal,
to assert prejudice. Thus, one of the reasons for the speedy trial
guarantee would be meaningless because acquitted defendants
would have no reason to appeal.
In addition, an important aspect of the Lee decision is its failure
to realize that prejudice may not be relevant to the speedy trial
issue. As one commentator has suggested, the requirement that
the defendant prove actual prejudice
defeats the goal of maintaining the reliability and integrity of the
guilt-determination process by requiring an impossible task . ..,
merges the right to a speedy trial into the broader right to due process and thus creates a danger of analytical confusion, and . ..
eviscerates the effectiveness of the speedy-trial guarantee as a
means of identfying and eliminating the causes of undue delay in the
20
criminal process.

Cf. King v. United States, 369 F.2d 213, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("[Pjroof
that particular facts are forgotten is seldom possible.").
118 United States v. Ewel, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1965).
119 185 Neb. at 200, 174 N.W.2d at 352 (Newton, J., concurring in finding
of guilt and dissenting from reduction of sentence).
120 Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476, 497 (1968).
Cf. United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 880 (1958) ("A showing of prejudice is not required when a
criminal defendant is asserting a constitutional right under the Sixth
Amendment.").
.17

494

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 50, NO. 3 (1971)

There appear to have been two reasons for the delay. First, the
trial court sustained the prosecution's objection to the appointment
of counsel. Second, nonresident trial judges appeared in the district court due to the local judge's inability to hear the case. The
test to be used, as the Nebraska court indicated, was whether the
12 1
delay was arbitrary or oppressive.
First, defense counsel was not appointed for some 268 days
because Lee's parents were capable of providing counsel for their
son. No contention was made that Lee could afford counsel. It
seems peculiar to determine that a youth who is without financial
support is somehow able to provide counsel, thus alleviating the
necessity of the state providing counsel. The better rule would
be to inquire into the parents' financial ability and willingness to
pay for counsel and then, if the parents refuse to pay for counsel,
22
appoint counsel.1
But more importantly the Lee court did not deem the denial
of counsel a concrete reason for delay. It cannot be doubted that
counsel, as opposed to the defendant, could have expedited a speedy
trial. For example, if as the court suggested one must explicitly
"demand" the right to a speedy trial, one can assume that only an
attorney would be aware of such a legal anomaly. Arguably the
denial of counsel was arbitrary; the defendant was in fact indigent.
Therefore, if the denial of counsel contributed to the delay, it could
be argued that the delay was arbitrary.
Secondly, it appears that the Nebraska Supreme Court placed
significance on the fact that on ten occasions non-resident judges
presided in the Lee matter. 23 Apparently the court attributed some
of the delay to that fact and held that portion to be reasonable. It
should not be a matter of uncommon experience that trial judges
will be unable to hear certain cases. If the state makes no reasonable attempt to insure that criminal matters will be brought to
121

185 Neb. at 190, 174 N.W.2d at 348.

122

See Mattis, Financial Inability to Obtain an Adequate Defense, 49
NEB. L. REV. 37, 54 (1969). See also Stifler, Determining the Financial
Status of an Accused, 54 ILL. B. J. 868 (1966). ABA STANDARDS RELATING

12

TO

PRovmiNG DEFENSE

SERVICES

§ 6.1 (1966): "Counsel should be

provided to any person who is financially unable to obtain adequate
representation without substantial hardship to himself or his family.
Counsel should not be denied to any person merely because his
friends or relatives have resources adequate to retain counsel .. .
Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The court considered the fact that on 10 occasions nonresident judges
sat as "nothing more than an indication of the extent that the temporary disability of the local judge may have contributed to the delay
of the trial in the instant case." 185 Neb. at 189, 174 N.W.2d at 347,
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the attention of nonresident judges then perhaps the state should
shoulder the responsibility. Since the government apparently concluded that it was simpler not to provide a system which would
actively inform nonresident judges of the status of pending criminal matters, why should the government not be forced to prove
124
the reasonableness of its priorities?
In conclusion, the Lee decision strongly indicates that the right
to a speedy trial in Nebraska is limited. Apparently a trial held
within the statutory time period, without an explicit, if not literal
demand for a speedier trial, without a conclusive showing of prejudice and without a blatantly arbitrary or oppressive attempt to
slow the trial will be found to be a speedy trial. The vigor of the
right to a speedy trial in Nebraska thus remains in doubt.
II.

REAL PROPERTY

A. State v. Bardsley, 185 Neb. 629, 177 N.W.2d 599 (1970).
In State v. Bardsley125 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
upon termination of a lease of state school land, unauthorized
permanent improvements became the property of the trustee State
Board of Educational Lands and Funds. In the absence of statute
or agreement providing otherwise, the lessee who made an unauthorized agreement was not entitled to remove the improvement or
to compensation for its value. In 1966, the court had decided in
Banks v. State 26 that a lessee who had made unauthorized improvements on school lands retained "substantial" property rights in
them and was entitled to compensation though they were attached
to the land. Although Bardsley might be interpreted as overruling
the Banks case, 2 7 the decisions are distinguishable. When considered together, they may be interpreted to provide a comprehensive doctrine, based on statute, case law and common law, which
controls ownership of improvements on state school lands.
Bardsley concerned the ownership of a $3,100 metal quonset
building which the lessee erected on state school land in 1954
124

125
126

Cf. Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1969), where
then Judge Blacknun suggested the need for coordination and stated:
"All judges share responsibility for prompt disposition of criminal
cases."
185 Neb. 629, 177 N.W.2d 599 (1970).
181 Neb. 106, 147 N.W.2d 132 (1966) (4-3 decision with 3 justices concurring separately).

127 See Lincoln Sunday Journal and Star, Nov. 15, 1970, at 4B, col. 1:

"Asst. Atty. General B. L. Packett appeared before the board [of
Educational Lands and Funds] last week. He said it is his judgment
the Bardsley decision in substance overruled the Banks case."
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without the lessor's authorization. The lease was executed in 1943
for a twenty-five year term. It did not include provisions which
would protect the lessee's interest in any improvements which
might be made during the tenancy. Without such an agreement
the lessee's rights depended on a statute which provided for appraisal of improvements and reimbursement for them at the termination of the lease. 28 However, this statute was declared unconstitutional in 1955 because it failed to provide for notice of the
appraisal to be given to the lessee. 29 The situation had been further
complicated by 1953 legislation which required the Board of Educational Lands and Funds to approve applications to construct improvements on leased school lands as a condition precedent
to
130
lessees' retention of property rights in those improvements.
The Nebraska Supreme Court determined the rights of the
parties by the law at the time of execution of the lease. In Bardsley,
since there was neither an agreement between the parties nor a
constitutional statute controlling ownership of improvements, the
court held that common law would govern. If the 1953 statute' 3 1 had
been applicable, the lessee could not have claimed a reimbursable
interest in the improvement because he had not obtained the
lessor's approval of the construction of improvements as required.
The court cited an earlier school lands case 1 32 which set out
the common law rule that "improvements which became a part of
the real estate may not be removed and do not become the property of the lessee. . .. ,.,3" When permanent improvements were
constructed without the owner's consent, the lessee forfeited his
"common law privilege of removal or a right to compensation.' 3 4
§

(1943).

128

NEB. REV. STAT.

129

Watkins v. Dodson, 159 Neb. 745, 68 N.W.2d 508 (1955).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-240.07 (Reissue 1966): "Before any buildings,
wells, irrigation improvements, dams, or drainage ditches are placed

130

72-240

upon school lands by a lessee, written approval must be obtained from
the Board of Educational Lands and Funds, except necessary improve-

ments for the temporary handling and sheltering of livestock. Any
such improvements placed upon school lands after September 14, 1953,
where written approval for such improvements was not obtained from
the board shall be considered improvements of the land and the lessee
shall not be entitled to reimbursement therefor."
131 Id. This statute was enacted subsequent to the execution of the lease,
but prior to the construction of the improvement.
132 Blomquist v. Board of Educ. Lands & Funds, 170 Neb. 741, 104 N.W.2d
264 (1960).
:33 170 Neb. at 747, 104 N.W.2d at 268.
'34 Banks v. State, 181 Neb. 106, 111, 147 N.W.2d 132, 135 (1966).
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At the ternination of the lease improvements
became part of the
135
realty and vested in the owner of the fee.
In Banks,136 the lease had been executed on October 16, 1953.
Later, the lessee had erected fences, a loading chute, corrals and a
windbreak, and had leveled 150 acres of the leased land for irrigation, all without the board's approval. Upon expiration of the lease
in 1965 the land was offered for sale' 37 and it therefore became
necessary to determine ownership of the unauthorized improvements.
The district court rendered a declaratory judgment quieting
title to the unauthorized improvements in the Board of Educational
Lands and -Funds. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that the right to reimbursement for improvements was controlled
by statutes which required appraisal and compensation for improvements regardless of authorization2 8 and other statutes which
required authorization for retention of ownership rights. 139 After
a comparison of these statutes,140 the court held that the lessee retained a compensable interest in unauthorized improvements unless
the improvement was within an enumerated category in the approval statute. The court also decided, on the strength of Mara v.
Normann,'4 ' that the lessee retained a compensable interest in other
improvements made prior to 1953.
The Banks rationale was that where ownership was governed
by statute, the lessee retained an interest in improvements which
do not require prior authorization under section 240.07 of Chapter
72 of the Nebraska statutes. The category of improvements which
do not require authorization may be determined by extending the
court's comparison of the "appraisal" and "approval" statutes. 42
185 Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N.W. 659 (1931).
136 181 Neb. 106, 147 N.W.2d 132 (1966).
137 Pursuant to Nim. REV. STAT. §§ 72-257, 72-258 (Supp. 1969).
138 NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-240.06 (Reissue 1966)
(repealed by Neb. Laws
c. 467, § 17 '(1967)). Appraisal of improvements is now controlled by
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 72-240.10 to -240.24 (Supp. 1969).
139 NEB. R v. STAT.

§

72-240.07 (Reissue 1966).

140 The court decided (1) that the loading chute, corrals and board wind-

break were "fencing" within the meaning of the "appraisal" statute;
(2) that "fencing" was specified for "appraisal" but not for "approval";

"fencing" was not unauthorized within the meaning of the statute;
and the lessee retained a right to reimbursement for those improve-

ments; and (3) that the land leveling was unauthorized and the lessee
was not entitled to compensation for this improvement.
'4'
162 Neb. 845, 77 N.W.2d 569 (1956).
142 This category includes fencing, windmills, pumps, tanks, assessments
paid to any irrigation district, conservation terraces, trees, plowing
for future crops, and alfalfa or other crops growing thereon.
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The approval statute excludes "necessary improvements for the
temporary handling 1 and
sheltering of livestock" from the authori43
zation requirement.
The Bardsley and Banks doctrines can be summarized in these
rules: (1) The rights of the parties to a lease of school land are
determined by the law in effect at the time of execution of the
lease. 144 (2) In the absence of an agreement between the lessor and
lessee, statutory law controls. In the absence of agreement or statute the common law controls. 145 (3) The "approval" statute only
controls the ownership of enumerated improvements in leases
executed after September 14, 1953.146 The lessee retains a compensable interest in authorized improvements, and in fencing,
windmills, pumps, tanks, assessments paid to any irrigation district,
conservation terraces, trees, plowing for future crops, and alfalfa
or other crops growing thereon, and in necessary improvements for
the temporary handling of livestock. 147 (4) The approval statute
does not apply to leases executed before September 14, 1953. Instead, in the absence of agreement, ownership of improvements is
controlled by the common law rule that "improvements which
become a part of the real estate may not be removed and do not
become the property of the lessee .... ,,148
This last doctrine enunciated in Bardsley is subject to criticism.
In determining the ownership of the metal quonset building, the
court relied on the common law rule stated in Blomquist v. Board
of Educational Lands and Funds. 49 The rule that fixtures are the
property of the lessor was extended to the Bardsley case despite
the well-recognized exception accorded to improvements made for
trade or agricultural purposes.
In Blomquist, the improvement was a twenty acre stand of
trees planted for domestic and commercial purposes. Of course, the
trees were improvements of a permanent nature, were attached to
the land and could not be removed without damage to the premises.
Tle Bardsley improvement was of a different nature, but the
14 NEB. REv. STAT. § 72-240.07 (Reissue
144 185 Neb. at 631, 177 N.W.2d at 601.
145 Id. at 632, 177 N.W.2d at 601.
146

181 Neb. at 110, 147 N.W.2d at 134.
§§ 72-240.06, 72-240.07 (Reissue 1966). A different rule
may govern leases executed subsequent to June 2, 1967, the day NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 72-240.10 to -240.24 (Supp. 1969) became effective, but
because NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 72-257, 72-258 (Supp. 1969) provide for the
sale of the school lands as leases expire, the problem is not extensive.
170 Neb. at 747, 104 N.W.2d at 268.
170 Neb. 741, 104 N.W.2d 264 (1960).

147 NEB. REv. STAT.

148
149

1966).
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court extended the common law rule of fixtures without considering
the equitable reasons to except fixtures placed on the land for
trade or agricultural purposes from a harsh rule which discourages
tenants from improving their leaseholds.
Justice Story, in Van Ness v. Pacord,50 explained that trade
and agricultural fixtures were excepted from the general rule that
fixtures are the property of the lessor in order to encourage enterprise and development. Nebraska has sought to encourage the construction of improvements on the state school lands to enhance
their value for agricultural purposes. 151 Furthermore, Nebraska has
applied the liberal rule that lessees could remove fixtures they
erected unless damage to the property might result or there was
15 2
a contrary agreement.
In cases such as Bardsley, where the ownership of improvements
on state school land is controlled by the common law, it is unfortunate that the Nebraska Supreme Court has not recognized the
special rules which the common law reserved for trade and agricultural fixtures. The decision will have both immediate and long
term consequences. In applicable cases at the termination of the
lease, tenants will lose their financial interest in improvements
which they have erected. In the absence of an agreement to protect their interests other lessees will be discouraged from improving
school lands.
B. Dewey v. Montessori Educational Center, Inc., 185 Neb. 791, 178
N.W.2d 792 (1970).
In Dewey v. Montessori Educational Center, Inc.,1 53 a case of
first impression in Nebraska, the court was called upon to answer
the question: is a nursery school a "school" within the contemplation of the Second Suburban Omaha zoning ordinance? The ordinance permits, among other things,"6. Schools, elementary and
High. ***9. Hospitals and institutions of an educational, philanthropic or eleemosynary nature."'15
Plaintiffs, who sought an injunction to restrain defendants'
operation of a nursery school in a suburban residential neighborhood, owned a $204,000 home next to the residence being used -as
iO 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829).

15 Banks v. State, 181 Neb. 106, 121, 147 N.W.2d 132, 140 (1966) (concurring opinion).
152 Moran v. Otoe County Natl Bank, 115 Neb. 515, 213 N.W. 824 (1927),
noted in 6 NEB. L. BuLL. 198 (1927).
153 185 Neb. 791, 178 N.W.2d 792 (1970).
154 Id. at 792, 178 N.W.2d at 793.
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a nursery school. 155 The court held that this nursery school did not
violate the zoning ordinance. 56
After Dewey how may municipalities exclude nursery schools
from residential neighborhoods? It is clear that in the future specific
terms must be utilized in zoning ordinances to successfully exclude
nursery schools from residential neighborhoods in Nebraska. Cases
from other jurisdictions will aid in pointing the direction.
The defendant school had an enrollment of fifty children aged
three to five years Monday through Friday, and fifteen two and onehalf year olds on Saturday morning. There was instruction in reading, mathematics, geography, art, music and languages, with each
child's progress reported periodically. 157 The trial court held these
activities constituted "[a] school program that is aimed 8primarily
'5
to introduce a child to a lifetime of creative learning.'
The construction which the court placed on the zoning ordinance arguably would allow the use even in property zoned First
Residential. A First Residential classification contains provision for
"schools elementary and high"'159 and also for "uses customarily incident to any of the above uses when located on the same lot and
not involving the conduct of any business."'' 60
The plaintiff argued that this was not an allowable school use,
but should properly be excluded because the "school" was operated
as a business. Furthermore the defendants' operation did not meet
the definition of an educational institution as described in section
nine of the ordinance. The court, however, dismissed both arguments and merely held that it was a school and not in violation of
the Omaha ordinance.
Property owners and cities have been notably unsuccessful in
excluding schools from residential districts. In discussing cases
from other jurisdictions involving nursery schools and day care
centers it is important to determine the degree of restrictiveness
of the language of the particular zoning ordinance involved.
155

Brief for Appellants at 5, Dewey v. Montessori Educational Center,

Inc., 185 Neb. 791, 178 N.W.2d 792 (1970).
156 "We hold that the private school operated by the defendants is a school

157

or educational institution, and the use of the defendants' property for
such is not a violation of the zoning ordinances of the city of Omaha."
185 Neb. at 793, 178 N.W.2d at 794.
Brief of Appellee at 18, Dewey v. Montessori Educational Center, Inc.,

158

Id. at 793, 178 N.W.2d at 794.

185 Neb. 797, 178 N.W.2d 792 (1970).

159 OMAHA, NEB. CODE § 55-28.020(6)

160 Id. § 55-10.020 (9).

(1959).
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•In Livingston v. Davis,'6 ' an Iowa case in which the facts were
essentially the same as those in Dewey, the court held a private
nursery school was a school within the statutory ambit of a zoning
ordinance that allowed "Public schools, Colleges, University Buildings and Uses, and Private Elementary Schools, taking only children
up to and not exceeding the age of 14.2'162 It rejected the argument
that nursery schools which failed to meet the statutory requirements for elementary and secondary schools were excluded from
the definition of schools in the zoning ordinance.
A similar result was reached in Chicago v. Sachs 163 although the
Illinois court held that a nursery school could not by implication
be included in the uses allowed by ordinance:
Nor does nursery school, or prekindergarten school, fall within the
commonly understood meaning of the term "grade school." The accepted definition of a grade school is "A school divided into successive grades" (Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd ed.) and
defendant's school is not so divided.-64
However, the Sachs court held the classification was unreasonable
since the ordinance allowed grade schools, high schools, boarding
schools, vocational schools, colleges and universities in the district.
The residential district in Sachs allowed many nonresidential uses,
being one of the least restricted residential zones under the Chicago zoning ordinance. Therefore, even though the court held a
nursery school was not a grade school, it struck down the classification in the ordinance and allowed the school.
New York allowed nursery schools in residential districts in
People v. Collins,165 holding that:
The value of pre-schools to children can hardly be questioned by anyone whose children have attended a well-run school of this character.
To limit the existence of such schools to the definition given in the
Education Law would mean that such schooling would be available
only to children of parents in the higher income brackets and live
[sic] in a larger center of population.168
The ordinance in Collins allowed "schools" in the district. In another
case the New York Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Su-

161

243 Iowa 21, 50 N.W.2d 592 (1951).

162 Id. at 25, 50 N.W.2d at 595.
163
104

165
166

1 Ill. 2d 342, 115 N.E.2d 762 (1953).
Id. at 344, 115 N.E.2d at 764.
191 Misc. 553, 83 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Westchester County Ct. 1948).
Id. at 555, 83 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
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preme Court, Nassau County, directing the board to grant a167permit
to conduct a nursery school in a residential neighborhood.
In these New York cases the ordinances lacked any clear indication that nursery schools were to be covered, but the courts felt
free to interpret the word schools to include private pre-schools
and allow operation of such institutions in residential neighborhoods.
On the other side of the issue, individuals and cities have had
success in barring such schools from residential districts when the
ordinance in question has been restrictive in its definition of schools
or where a special permit has been required to operate such a
school in a residential district.
New York has allowed a city to refuse a permit to a nursery
school when the applicable ordinance specifically provided that such
schools would be permitted only as a special exception. 168
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana has held the operation of a
nursery school, kindergarten or play school was not within the
contemplation of an ordinance allowing the operation of "public
schools, and educational institutions having a curriculum the same
as that ordinarily given in public schools."'16 9 In addition to the
allowable uses in the R-1 district above, the R-3, Multiple Family
[Residential District provided:
Nursery Schools, pre-schools, and kindergartens, privately operated
must provide a minimum play area of two hundred (200) square feet
a height of not
for each child and such play area must be enclosed to
170
less than four (4) feet, not more than six (6) feet.
The court held that since a nursery school did not have the same
curriculum as public schools it was limited to locating in the R-3
district.
Creative County Day School, Inc. v. Burns, 18 App. Div. 2d 938, 238
N.Y.S.2d 348 (1963).
168 "The pertinent provisions of the Building Zone Ordinance of the Town
of Oyster Bay provide: '. . . In 'D" Residence District, no building or
premises shall be used and no building shall be hereafter erected or
altered, unless otherwise provided for in this Ordinance, except for
one or more of the following uses: . . . 5. A regularly organized university, college, elementary or high school having a curriculum approved by the Board of Regents of the State of New York. 5a. A
regularly organized Nursery School when permitted by the Town
Board as a special exception, after a public hearing." Rockefeller v.
Pynchon, 41 Misc. 2d 1, 2, 244 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
169 Parish of Jefferson v. Carl, 195 So.2d 401, 402 (La. App. 1967).
170 Id.
167
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In another Louisiana case, Lakeside Day Care Center, Inc. v.
Board of Adjustment,"1 1 the Court of Appeal of Louisiana held a
day care center operating six days a week, eleven hours a day,
twelve months a year was not a nursery, pre-kindergarten or kindergarten school allowed in the zoning ordinance:
The primary purpose of a day care center is not education but instead
the all day care of children of working mothers. To qualify under the
terms of the Baton Rouge Zoning Ordinance for "A-i" districts, the
appellants would have to change their operation from one set up
primarily to give all day care
to children, to one set up primarily for
the education of children.172
Lakeside points out one distinction that was not considered in
Dewey. If nursery schools are allowed uses, are day care centers
also allowed? The significant difference is that little or no instruction is offered in day care centers. Their purpose is to watch over
children rather than prepare them for further schooling in primary
schools. Whether Nebraska will draw this distinction is an open
question.
If one of the aims of a zoning ordinance is to classify and protect some areas, such as residential neighborhoods, restrictive language must be utilized to avoid problems such as the encroachment of nursery schools into residential areas. Nebraska has accepted the view that nursery schools are allowed uses in residential
areas. Therefore it is time to reconsider the uses and descriptions
used in enacting zoning laws. Although Dewey is a case of first
impression in Nebraska, it seems possible to artfully draft zoning
ordinances that will be effective in excluding nursery schools from
residential neighborhoods. This can be accomplished either by requiring permits or providing explicit exclusion of such uses from
residential neighborhoods.
C. Westbrook v. Masonic Manor, 185 Neb. 660, 178 N.W.2d 280
(1970).
In Westbrook v. Masonic Manor,1 3 the court was faced with
some of the problems created by cooperative living organizations.
The dispute involved a disagreement about the rights and obligations of the tenants and the organization.
The Manor was organized as an association of tenant owned
apartments. However, it did not conform to either of the two types
of organizations most often used for such ventures: condominiums
171 121 So.2d 335
172 Id. at 339.

(La. App. 1960).

173 185 Neb. 660, 178 N.W.2d 280 (1970).
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and cooperative stock corporations. Reference to case law involving
these two types of organizations emphasizes why the Manor's
organization was defective. In particular, other contract provisions
on termination rights should prove instructive.
In Masonic Manor, plaintiff and defendant entered into a residency contract on July 3, 1964, which provided that for a 5,000
dollar entry fee the plaintiff was entitled to live in an assigned
apartment for life, subject to payment of a pro rata share of
monthly expenses. 174 The contract further provided that "upon
relinquishment... and written demand ... ninety percent of any
-175
payment on entrance fees is refundable ....

174 Record, vol. 1, at 4, Westbrook v. Masonic Manor, 185 Neb. 660, 178
N.W.2d 280 (1970):
"APPLICATION
hereby make(s) application for admission to the Masonic Manor at
52nd & Leavenworth Streets, Omaha, Nebraska.
In consideration of the acceptance of this application, the payment
of an entrance fee will be made in the sum of $5,000.00 for a onebedroom apartment.
It is further agreed that the payment of an entrance fee shall be
inferior and subordinate to any mortgage which the Masonic Manor
has or may place on the premises and whatever subordination agreement is needed will be executed upon request.
,196DATED this
day of
ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT
The above application is approved and accepted, and receipt is
from
hereby acknowledged of $
in payment of an entrance fee which, when applicant(s) is/are retired or 62 years of age or over, will entitle
to live in an assigned apartment in the Masonic Manor for life, subject to a monthly payment of a proportionate share of expenses,
maintenance and amortization of loan, and also subject to the rules and
regulations which will be adopted to govern the Manor. This right to
live in the Manor is not assignable.
It is agreed that, upon relinquishment of the apartment provided
for herein and upon the written demand of applicant(s) or
heirs or assigns, ninety per cent of any
payment on entrance fees is refundable as soon as the Masonic Manor
secures another applicant for the apartment being released.
This payment entitles applicant(s) to the
place for choice of exposure and floor for an apartment.
DATED this
day of
196_._
MASONIC MANOR
By

175

Id.
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After almost three years' occupancy, plaintiff gave notice on
March 1, 1967, that he would vacate the apartment April 1, 1967.16
On March 19, 1967, defendant's board of directors passed a resolution providing that as of March 20, 1967, "owners of resident tenancy
contracts would be responsible for the monthly prorata [sic] payment whether the apartment was occupied or not. 11 77 The apartment was vacated on April 1, 1967, and "resold" on September
15, 1968. At that time defendant sent a check to plaintiff for
$2,398.75.17 s This amount was determined by crediting plaintiff with
5,400 dollars (ninety percent of the new entry fee of 6,000 dollars) 179
less the monthly pro rata share for seventeen and one-half months
or $3,001.25. Plaintiff brought suit to recover ninety p~rcent of his
5,000 dollar entry fee. The trial court held for plaintiff and the
supreme court affirmed with one dissent.
Both the condominium and the cooperative stock corporation
provide for ownership rights in tenants. The condominium is recognized by statute in Nebraska; 180 individual apartments may be
owned in fee by the tenant. 181 The cooperative stock company is
1 82
organized as a corporation with shares of stock sold to tenants,
which gives them the right to a proprietary lease. 8 3 The lease and
stock coupled with the bylaws of the association constitute the
contract between the tenant and the association.
The Masonic Manor organization appears to be more like a
cooperative stock corporation than a simple condominium. While
there was no stock issued to the tenant the residency contract was
similar to a proprietary lease; however, it granted only the right
"to live in an assigned apartment in the Masonic Manor for
life. . . .,8 The entry fee assessed was similar to purchase of stock,
and the required monthly payment of a share of the complex
185 Neb. at 661, 178 N.W.2d at 281.
Id. at 662, 178 N.W.2d at 281.
178 Brief for Appellant at 6, Westbrook v. Masonic Manor, 185 Neb. 660,
178 N.W.2d 280 (1970).
179 Id. The entry fee had been raised on October 1, 1965.
180 NE. REv. STAT. §§ 76-801 to -823 (Reissue 1966); see also Comment,
The Nebraska Condominium Property Act, 44 NE. L. Rnv. 658 (1965)
for an analysis of the Nebraska Act.
181 NEm. REv. STAT. § 76-804 (Reissue 1966).
182 Some courts have held that such cooperatives can be organized under
cooperative stock corporation acts even if designed for farming cooperatives. See, e.g., State ex rel. Leavell v. Nelson, 387 P.2d 82, 63
Wash. 299 (1963). Nebraska has such an act: NE. REv. STAT. §§ 211301 to -1306 (Reissue 1970).
183 Whitebook, The Cooperative Apartment, 9 PRAc. LAw. 4, 25, 29 (April
1963).
184 See note 174 supra.
176

177
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expenses was identical to the maintenance charge of cooperative
apartments. 185
In Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp.,8" the New York City Court
distinguished between a condominium and a co-op:
It is noteworthy that a condominium conveys "units" by "recorded
deeds" while an ordinary cooperative leases "apartments" to shareholder lessees by "proprietary leases." Unlike a cooperative, management of a condominium does not have the sword of summary proceedings. A defaulting unit owner submits his unit to a lien in favor of
his co-owners, which lien may be foreclosed in the same manner as
a mortgage ....
A corporate cooperative thus indicates an entity holding title to
all the premises and granting rights of occupancy to particular
apartments. The condominium, on the other hand, refers specifically
to schemes of individual ownership of individual apartments organized pursuant to statutory authority ....187
It would appear that Masonic Manor was an attempt to combine the two types of organization: retaining title in the corporation and making the tenant liable for charges after surrender of
his apartment. The Manor tried to accomplish this without any
express covenant in the lease.
Since the term of the Masonic Manor lease was for the life of
the tenant, if the position of the defendants had been sustained the
Manor could require tenants to pay the monthly share for the rest
of their natural lives. Since no mention of this aspect of the arrangement was made in either the majority or dissenting opinions, it
is impossible to know if it was considered.
In the condominium and the cooperative stock company the
owner or lessee of an apartment has something he can sell. 88 The
organizations cannot subject the individual owner or lessee to any
liability by imposition of unreasonable restraints on his right to
rid himself of an unwanted apartment. 8 9 Arguably the organization
must offer some kind of escape even if they wish to hold the
owner or lessee to his contract.1 0 Often the organization is bound
to meet the best offer a tenant has received for his property if they
wish to block the sale to a particular offeror, or at least offer a
185 Id.

43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. City Ct. 1964).
Id. at 592, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 327 (citations omitted).
188 The tenant may sell either the stock or the fee title, usually subject
to a right of first refusal on the part of the organization. See Note,
Right of First Refusal--Homogeneity in the Condominium, 18 VAND.
L. REv. 1810 (1965).
189 Id. at 1811-16.
190 Id.
186
187
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reasonable price for the tenant's interests, whether or not they
meet the best offer. This of course provides the owner or lessee
an opportunity to get out of the arrangement if he wishes to move.
While he may be required to take a loss, it is unlikely that a tenant
would ever encounter the Masonic Manor delay of eighteen months
during which time he must continue to pay rent.
It is also possible that the contract created a life estate in the
tenant. Two cases from other jurisidictions have held that such
leases created life estates. In Thompson v. Baxter,'9' the lease provided:
"To have and to hold the above-rented premises unto the said party
of the second part [the tenant], his heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns, for the full term of while he shall wish to live in Albert
Lea, from and after the 1st day of December, 1904."1902

The court held that this lease contained all the essential elements
of a life estate.
In Tinkham v. Wind 9 3 the provisions read: "to hold for and
during the term of the natural lives of the lessees and the survivor
of them."' 94 The lessees' rental obligation was to maintain the property, pay a portion of the taxes and water charges, and insure the
property for the benefit of the lessor. The Massachusetts court
held that "[t]he lease created a life estate determinable upon the
stated contingencies."' 9 5
In Masonic Manor, the "lease" provided for the right to live in
the apartment for life subject to payment of a monthly share of
expenses. While the question is left open, it would be undesirable
under today's conditions to hold that this type of arrangement constituted a life estate, in light of these cases setting out the legal
relationship existing between the tenant and the organization in
cooperative living units.
The majority in Masonic Manor appears to base its decision
upon four grounds: first, that relinquishment of the apartment
amounted to a surrender of the right to live in the apartment; second, that the defendant construed the contract not to require the
monthly payment if the apartment was not occupied; third, that the
action of the board on March 19 was a modification of the contract
and not binding on the plaintiff; and fourth, that the interpretation
191 107 Minn. 122, 119 N.W. 797 (1909).
192

Id. at 123, 119 N.W. at 797.

319 Mass. 158, 65 N.E.2d 14 (1946).
194 Id. at 159, 65 N.E.2d at 15.
19s Id.
193
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of the contract by the parties was "one of the best indications of the
true intent of the contract." 196
The dissent also relied heavily on contract interpretation, arguing that the contract was not ambiguous and therefore not open
to construction by the court:
Surrender of the apartment did not terminate plaintiff's rights to
that apartment under the terms of the contract; it merely meant

that plaintiff would be entitled to a ninety percent refund of any payment on entrance fees, as soon as another applicant was secured for
the released apartment.197
The dissent contended that mutual interpretation by the parties
was required before that interpretation could be given "great or
... 191 However, it also pointed out that the
controlling weight.
entire enterprise would be threatened if tenants could escape their
responsibility to pay their share of expenses. While the dissent
raises serious policy considerations, it also leaves important questions unanswered.
The defendant was a retirement home for Masons. The residency contract which granted the right to live in the manor for life
certainly seemed to envision applicants remaining in the complex
until death. The majority opinion implied that if the original contract had covered the question of expenses between the surrender
of the premises and its resale those provisions would have been
binding. Given this, future leases will undoubtedly be drawn to
provide for the payment of expenses during this period. The tenant
in Masonic Manor could have been liable for the payment of seventeen and one-half months' pro rata share of expenses; the next
case could find a tenant obligated to pay expenses on an unoccupied
apartment for life.
The question then becomes one of policy. Should persons be
bound by leases that make them liable for payments for the remainder of their lives even though the property involved is no
longer being used? What weight should be given to the need of
the organization to have a continuous and predictable flow of money
to meet its obligations?
A public policy opposed to such oppressive and perhaps unconscionable leases may be desirable. The court seems to have missed
an opportunity to clearly delineate the legal status of the cooperative apartment in Nebraska. Alternatives to the court's view that
196 185 Neb. at 663, 178 N.W.2d at 282.
197 Id. at 664, 178 N.W.2d at 282 (White, C. J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 667, 178 N.W.2d at 284 (White, C. J., dissenting).
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express terms in a residency contract could not bind a tenant for
life could include imposing limits on the time allowed the association to resell the apartment and hold the tenant liable for expenses or giving the tenant the right to transfer his interest to
anyone without association approval after a stipulated period.
While this may be a political rather than a judicial problem, the
court might have encouraged legislative action by articulating the
problems involved in such arrangements.
III.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Abbott v. Abbott, 185 Neb. 177, 174 N.W.2d 335 (1970).
In Abbott v. Abbot, 199 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
a cause of action stated in an amended petition relates back to the
date of the original complaint. Therefore, even though a new theory
of recovery is introduced by the amendment, it is not barred by
the statute of limitations when the petitioner is seeking recovery on
the same general set of facts. This new interpretation of the relation back rule changes the supreme court's prior view that an
amendment introducing a new theory of recovery was equivalent
to the filing of a new action. The statute of limitations had been
viewed as running continuously up to the date of the successful
amendment.
The controversy in Abbott arose after the defendant refused to
honor an oral agreement for the settlement of her husband's estate.20 0 Her son, the plaintiff, who agreed to appear as a subscribing
witness to his father's will in county court and thus suffer a reduction in the beneficial devise made to him in the will, 20 1 filed his
original petition on December 26, 1963. He alleged as grounds for
the action the contested will, an oral family settlement, the defendant's oral promises to restore his share of the estate to equality
with his brothers and sisters, his acceptance and performance of
the offer, and defendant's nonperformance; he did not allege fraud
or undue influence. On January 4, 1965, more than four years after
distribution of the estate the plaintiff filed a second petition alleging promissory fraud and undue influence. The district court found
that the cause of action alleged in the amended petition was barred
by the statute of limitations and rendered summary judgment for
the defendant.
199 185 Neb. 177, 174 N.W.2d 335 (1970).
200 The oral agreement was designed to allow the probate of the will without Mrs. Abbott testifying as one of the subscribing witnesses. Id. at
178-79, 174 N.W.2d at 337.
201 NEB.

Rsv. STAT.

§ 30-208 (Reissue 1964).
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On appeal, the first question presented was whether, for purposes of the statute of limitations, the amended pleadings related
back to the date of filing of the original petition. The four member
majority held with reference to the goal of adjudication on the
merits that commencement of the action on Arthur Abbott's original
petition stopped the running of the statute of limitations against
the cause of action in the second amended petition. Thus the Nebraska rule was reformulated: "A cause of action pleaded by
amendment ordinarily relates back to the original pleading provided that the claimant seeks recovery on the same general set
202
of facts.1

The decision was unmistakably influenced by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 20 3 and introduced the equivalent of the federal
rule of relation back of amendments to pleadings into Nebraska
law.20 4 Although there is available precedent for such a rule in
code pleading jurisdictions, 20 5 the majority placed the decision on
the policy basis of encouraging adjudication on the merits.
The dissent faulted the new rule for lack of precedent in code
pleading jurisdictions and for vagueness in a procedural area where
certainty and definiteness are required. 20 Although the old rule
may have fostered certainty through application of the mechanical
"introduction of a new cause of action" test, this was achieved at the
expense of adjudications on the merits.20 7 Under the old test, courts
often used any one of a series of rules to distinguish new from
amended causes of action. 20 8 As may be expected the application
of these rules to fact situations led to a variety of results.
202 185 Neb. at 181, 174 N.W.2d at 338.

The court cited 1A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDLMAL PRACMICE AND
PROcEauRP § 448 (1960) and 3 J. MOORE, FDEM PRACTiCE §§ 15.05,
15.15 (3) (2d ed. 1968).
204 See FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (c).
205 Wilson v. Bittick, 63 Cal. 2d 30, 403 P.2d 159, 45 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1965);
Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding Ins. Co., 56 CaL 2d 596, 364 P.2d 681,
15 Cal. Rptr.817 (1961).
206 The dissent found authority lacking for the majority's conclusion that
the Nebraska rule was objectionable "in the best modern view" and
also criticized the new rule test of "'general set of facts'" as so "vague
in nature" as to "furnish virtually no guideline at all." 185 Neb. at 183,
174 N.W.2d at 339 (White, C.J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 181, 174 N.W.2d at 338.
208 In Nebraska these rules included: (1) "An amended pleading which
only amplifies or gives greater fullness of detail than is alleged in the
original pleading does not state a new cause of action." Tennyson v.
Werthman, 167 Neb. 208, 212, 92 N.W.2d 559, 562 (1958); (2) "A cause
of action alleged in an amended petition, although founded upon the
same injury as that described in the original, is a different cause
203

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Zitnik v. Union Pacific Railroad2 9 applied the rule that "an amended petition which only amplifies, clarifies, or gives greater fullness of detail than is alleged
in the original petition does not state a new cause of action." The
original petition in that action alleged negligent operation of a
locomotive which had run over plaintiff's husband. The amended
pleading alleged negligence on the part of the railroad in failing
to provide an employee to warn deceased of approaching locomotives. The court found the amended pleading did not state a
different cause of action, but was only an amplification of the
original petition.
In Blair v. Klein210 the Nebraska court decided that the amended
pleading, although founded on the same injury described in the
original petition, was a different cause of action because it was dependent entirely upon different reasons for holding the defendant
liable. The original petition sought damages for breach of a contract to secure automobile insurance. The defendant insurance
agent failed to secure the insurance and the vehicle involved was
destroyed in an accident. After the statute of limitations had run,
plaintiff amended his petition to add allegations of negligence in
the failure to secure the insurance. The defendant's motion for a
directed verdict was granted because the amended petition introduced a new and different cause of action which could not relate
back to the original petition and therefore was barred by the statute
of limitations.
In recent decisions the Nebraska court has applied "the preservation of the identity of the cause of action" test. In Muenchau v.
Swarts,21 1 the plaintiff, a mechanical contractor, brought -an action
of action, if it is dependent entirely upon different reasons for holding
the defendant responsible for the wrong alleged." Johnson v. American Smelting & Refining Co., on rehearing, 80 Neb. 255, 261, 116 N.W.
517, 519 (1908) (cited in Blair v. Klein, 176 Neb. 245, 251, 125 N.W.2d
669, 672 (1964)); (3) If "t]he identity of the cause of action is preserved, the particular allegations of the petition may be changed and
others added in order to cure imperfections and mistakes in the manner of stating the plaintiff's case." Muenchau v. Swarts, 170 Neb. 209,
215, 102 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1960) (citing Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Barnes, 143 Neb. 58, 8 N.W.2d 545 (1943)). See also 3. R. Watkins
Co. v. Wiley, 182 Neb. 242, 153 N.W.2d 871 (1967); May Plumbing Co. v.
Shaver, 182 Neb. 251, 153 N.W.2d 911 (1967); (4) Changes in the form
o action or relief sought, where facts remain essentially the same,
are amendments to original pleading, not changes in the cause of ac209
210
211

tion. Finzer v. Peter, 120 Neb. 389, 232 N.W. 762 (1930).
95 Neb. 152, 155, 145 N.W. 344, 345 (1914).
176 Neb. 245, 125 N.W.2d 669 (1964).
170 Neb. 209, 102 N.W.2d 129 (1960).
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against the owner of a new house to foreclose a mechanic's lien
for services and material furnished in construction of the house.
The original petition alleged a cause of action on an oral contract
between the mechanical contractor and the owner. The petition was
amended after the statute of limitations had run to allege a cause
of action against the owner of the house on an agreement between
the plaintiff and a general contractor. The court found that the
identity of plaintiff's cause of action was preserved so that a new
cause of action had not been introduced. The statute of limitations
was thus not a bar to the plaintiff's suit.
There were several intermediate determinations necessary in
these cases for resolving the issue of what constituted a "new cause
of action." First, the nature of the actions alleged in the original
petition and in the amended petition had to be classified, that is,
ex contractu, ex delicto. Second, the actions had to be compared to
determine if the amendment introduced a cause of action of a different genre than the original action. If the amended pleading alleged
a cause of action based on a different theory, then the amendment
introduced a new cause of action and was not allowed if the statute
of limitations had run. Such a result resembled the now discredited
"theory of the pleadings" doctrine and was inconsistent with the
212
code plan of only pleading facts.
The basic problem running through all of the four rules which
were used to determine if an amendment stated a new cause of
action was the unarticulated yet underlying definition of a cause
of action. In the Blair decision the court observed: "'The cause of
action in any case embraces, not only the injury which the complaining party has received, but it includes more. All the facts
which, taken together, are necessary to fix the responsibility are
parts of the cause of action.' "213
In Abbott, the Nebraska Supreme Court has at least approached
the problem of determining what constitutes a new cause of action
in an amended pleading in terms that coincide with the modern
Nebraska definition of cause of action: "A cause of action pleaded
by amendment ordinarily relates back to the original pleading provided that the claimant seeks recovery on the same general set of
214
facts."
212 C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 43
213 176 Neb. at 252, 125 N.W.2d

(2d ed. 1947).

at 673 (quoting Johnson v. American
Smelting and Refining Co., on rehearing, 80 Neb. 255, 258, 116 N.W.
517, 518 (1908)). Cf. C. CLARK, supra note 212, at 137: "The cause of
action must... be such an aggregate of operative facts as will give
rise to at least one right of action, but is not limited to a single right."
214 185 Neb. at 181, 174 N.W.2d at 338 (emphasis added).
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B. State ex rel. Sampson v. Kenny, 185 Neb. 177, 174 N.W.2d 335
(1970).
State ex rel. Sampson v. Kenny 215 was a mandamus action
brought by property owners and taxpayers, as relators, to order
the County Treasurer to carry out his duties under the tax refund
statute.216 Nebraska courts are authorized to allow class actions
217
when a common question or a large number of parties is involved.
However, when the interests of the litigants or the courts are not
well served, the class action is not allowed. Sampson prompts an
examination of both the court's balancing of the competing considerations involved in the case and the further delineation of the
kinds of actions which cannot be maintained as class actions.
The relators' petition alleged: (1) their ownership of property
which had been annexed by Bellevue in 1965; (2) that a Sarpy
County district court judgment had declared the annexation invalid
and that the taxes levied under the invalid annexation were illegal
and void; (3) a claim for refund of monies paid to the county treasurer and his refusal to act; and (4) the right to join all other taxpayers having the right to file a claim for such a refund. The county
treasurer answered that his only interest in the litigation was the
discharge of his duties in the collection and disbursement of taxes;
therefore, he requested direction as to the proper discharge of those
duties. The trial court, however, granted leave to the City of
Bellevue to intervene. This intervenor moved to strike the paragraph seeking to join other taxpayers similarly situated.2 18 The
trial court granted the motion and on the plaintiffs' failure to further plead, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action.
Chief Justice White initially stated the issue in the case to be
"whether the relators have the legal capacity to join all of the
taxpayers similarly situated in a class action for mandamus against
the county treasurer. 219 However, the court did not decide this
question, disposing of the case on a narrower issue.
The relators had petitioned the supreme court to make provision for payment of the refund claims to all persons situated in
the areas illegally annexed. The court found that the petition and
the relators' brief thus narrowed the issue to a determination of
whether the relators might maintain this class action on behalf
215 185 Neb. 230, 175 N.W.2d 5 (1970).

218

NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-1734 et seq. (Reissue 1966).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-319 (Reissue 1964).
Record, vol. 1, at 10, State ex Tel. Sampson v. Kenny, 185 Neb. 230,

219

185 Neb. at 231, 175 N.W.2d at 6.

216
217

175 N.W.2d 5 (1970).
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of all other taxpayers for the recovery of the refunds due to each
one individually. 220 This question had in fact been decided in Mon.teith v. Alpha High School District,2 1 where the court held that
a taxpayer could not maintain a class action to recover void taxes.
By hinging the relators' cause of action on the second issue, the
question initially presented was avoided.
The court justified avoiding the initial question of relators' capacity to join all taxpayers similarly situated in a mandamus action
by noting that, "[w]hile in form the action purports to be directed
at the enforcement of the ministerial function by the county treasurer, the enforcement of a judgment in such a case would or might
involve judicial control, interference with, and usurpation of the
ministerial function of a statutory officer. '222 This consideration
was complemented by the court's finding that the legislative intent
of the Nebraska tax refund statute223 was to require individual taxpayer initiative to obtain a tax refund. Balancing the interests of
the state against the interests of the taxpayers, the court concluded
that even if the resolution of common questions would224prevent a
multiplicity of suits, discretion would not allow this suit.
Although the question of the taxpayer's capacity to bring a class
action of mandamus was not decided, the court's resolution of the
narrower issue, the capacity of a taxpayer to bring a class action
for the recovery of funds due to each taxpayer individually, may
provide a useful indication of the kinds of class actions that may
be brought.
The court should avoid judicial involvement in administrative
decisions of the county treasurer. However, close analysis reveals
that much of the court's concern in this case may have been unwarranted. Although the refund statute subjects the legality and
validity of the tax refund to an administrative determination, the
prior district court decree declaring the annexation and tax levy
void and illegal precludes further substantive consideration of the
validity of the tax. The claim for a refund was clearly to recover
taxes paid under the void and illegal levy. In order to make the
refund, the Sarpy County Treasurer would have to determine the
amount involved, the area subject to the void levy, the number of
years for which a refund was due, and the identities of the taxpayers entitled to a refund. The decree of the district court in the
annexation case, the public tax records, and the refund statute pro220 Id. at 231-32, 175 N.W.2d at 6.
221 125 Neb. 665, 251 N.W. 661 (1933).
222 185 Neb. at 233, 175 N.W.2d at 7.
223 NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1736.04 (Supp. 1969).
224 185 Neb. at 233, 175 N.W.2d at 7.
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vide the necessary information. The amount of the refund claimed
was the amount of the void tax. The property involved was located
in the area of the invalid annexation. Since the levy was void from
its inception and the statute of limitations had not run, the refund
was claimed for all illegal taxes paid. The tax refund statute provides that the person who paid the tax is entitled to the refund. A
court decree ordering a county treasurer to make the refund could
hardly involve judicial usurpation, control or interference in the
ministerial duties of the county treasurer when the major questions
had already been decided by legislative or other judicial bodies.
The Sampson decision is noteworthy because of the Nebraska
Supreme Court's willingness to consider and weigh the hypothetical
in balancing competing considerations. The court was concerned
with "all of the procedural difficulties and confusion' which could
possibly arise, for example, whether a person who had purchased
real property subsequent to the payment of the illegal levy could
recover a refund when he had never paid the tax. Other problems
were not listed, but it is clear from the court's decision that hypothetical difficulties which might involve the judiciary in the county
treasurer's ministerial functions weighed heavily against the use
of a class action to resolve a common question and prevent a multiplicity of suits.

The decision in Sampson is more easily justified by the court's
second consideration. Generally, a tax paid under mistake of law
cannot be recovered unless special relief is provided. In Nebraska
this relief is authorized by a tax refund statute requiring individual
initiative on the part of each taxpayer to claim a refund.225 In the

Sampson case, the individual taxpayer initiative requirement would
not be strictly satisfied if the relief requested were granted. However, reliance on this single criterion is not convincing because the

individual claim requirement is essentially procedural and does
not reach the substantive right to a refund.

In addition, the court's necessarily vague balancing of real and
hypothetical considerations departs from the 226
former broad interpretation of the Nebraska class action statute.
225

226

"[T]he person claiming a refund, or the agent or authorized representative of such person, shall file a claim with the county treasurer for
such refund .... ." NE. R.Ev. STAT. § 77-1736.04 (Supp. 1969).
In previous decisions the Nebraska Supreme Court has allowed class
actions where (1) priority of appropriation on the Loup Rivers was
involved and a junior appropriator brought an action on behalf of
himself and all other appropriators similarly situated to determine the
validity of a senior appropriation in proceedings before the department
of water resources (Hickman v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 173
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Where the Sampson court chose not to decide the broader issue
of the capacity of a taxpayer to join other taxpayers similarly
situated in a class action of mandamus against a county treasurer,
and disposed of the case on a narrower issue by means of a vague
balancing of real and hypothetical issues, the current position on
the extension of the class action to cases involving taxpayer protection was revealed.
The court's concern for the security of the public treasurer has
safeguarded tax revenues, but this security has been purchased at
the expense of taxpayers whose individual claims for refund are
too small to justify litigation. In all probability, the interests of the
local governmental subdivision and the adverse effect the class
action would have had on the public treasury are controlling factors
which should serve to distinguish this restrictive decision from
prior judicial approval of extensions of the class action. Nonetheless, the court's willingness to look behind the petition to consider
the possible consequences of the relief demanded, and the balancing
of hypothetical issues instead of the issues actually involved provide a means by which all class actions could be avoided. That decision should ultimately rest with the legislature, not the courts.
C. Lydick v. Johns, 185 Neb. 717, 178 N.W.2d 581 (1970).
In the case of Lydick v. Johns227 the question was: when may
an appeal bond be so defective that it divests the court of jurisdiction? More specifically: does the failure to conform to all the
requirements of the statute result in a lack of jurisdiction to hear
the case?
Lydick was an appeal from the revocation of plaintiff's operator's
license by the director of the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles under the implied consent rule. Plaintiff notified the depart22 8
ment by letter of his intention to appeal pursuant to statute.

-227
:22

Neb. 428, 113 N.W.2d 617 (1962)); (2) a school district reorganization
was challenged by a taxpayer who brought a petition in error to reverse and set aside an order of the county superintendent fixing
boundaries. The court upheld the action against the superintendent
and the signers of the petitions requesting redistricting by allowing
service of process on and defense by members of the class of petition
signers (Keedy v. Reid, 165 Neb. 519, 86 N.W.2d 370 (1957)); (3) confirmation of the validity of a reclamation district was sought in special
proceedings, the court holding it was not necessary to make all land
owners in the district parties (Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation Dist.
v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.W.2d 397 (1950)).
185 Neb. 717, 178 N.W.2d 581 (1970).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-420 (Reissue 1968).
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An appeal bond in the amount of $200 was enclosed in the letter.
The bond contained blanks to be filled in by the auditor of public
accounts since the auditor's approval is required by statute.229 The
personnel in the office accepted and filed the bond, but neither the
plaintiff nor the department of motor vehicles procured the approval of the auditor. Plaintiff's attorney called the department on
the last day for appeal and inquired if the bond had been received,
accepted and filed. He was told by an employee "that the bond
had been filed and marked as filed on that day." 230
The department subsequently demurred to plaintiff's petition
in the district court of Douglas County, challenging the jurisdiction
of the court because of the plaintiff's failure to file a bond approved
by the auditor of public accounts. The court overruled the demurrer, allowed plaintiff to amend the bond, and rendered judgment
for the plaintiff when defendants elected to stand on their demurrer.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding that: "[T]he filing
of an approved bond is a jurisdictional requirement. Its filing is23a1
condition precedent to the initiation of the appellate process.1
There are two lines of precedent in Nebraska bearing on this
question. The first indicates that an appeal bond is jurisdictional
and all requirements must be met to confer any jurisdiction, the
second that an appeal bond is jurisdictional but amendment should
be allowed where the defect is insubstantial.
The cases cited to support the view that all requirements must
be met to confer jurisdiction fall into three categories: cases where
the bond was given out of time;2 3 2 cases where the bond was approved by the wrong official;2 3 3 and cases where the action was
commenced in the wrong county. 234 In the cases filed out of time
a variety of reasons appear to explain the defect. One case involved
229

230
231

232

233
234

'"The applicant, licensee or appellant shall within twenty days from
the date of the final order complained of, execute a bond for costs
to the State of Nebraska in the sum of two hundred dollars with sufficient surety to be approved by the Auditor of Public Accounts." Id.
185 Neb. at 721, 178 N.W.2d at 584.
Id. at 719, 178 N.W.2d at 582.
Radil v. State, 182 Neb. 291, 154 N.W.2d 466 (1967); Brown v. Omaha,
179 Neb. 224, 137 N.W.2d 814 (1965); Drier v. Knowles Vans, Inc., 144
Neb. 619, 14 N.W.2d 222 (1944); Barney v. Platte Valley Pub. Power
& Irr. Dist., 144 Neb. 230, 13 N.W.2d 120 (1944); Sommerville v. Bd.
of County Comn'rs., 116 Neb. 282, 216 N.W. 815, affirmed on rehearing, 117 Neb. 507, 221 N.W. 433 (1928); Cedar County v. McKinney
Loan & Inv. Co., 1 Neb. (Unof.) 411, 95 N.W. 605 (1901).
Reiber v. Harris, 179 Neb. 582, 139 N.W.2d 353 (1966); Barney v. Platte
Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 144 Neb. 230, 13 N.W.2d 120 (1944).
Peck v. Dunlevey, 184 Neb. 812, 172 N.W.2d 814 (1969).
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the recent amendment which changed the procedure to be followed
from "timely filing of a notice of appeal" to "within 30 days. 23 5 In
three cases there was a miscalculation of when the time for appeal
began to run.23 6 And in one case the bond was not tendered until
eight months after final judgment had been rendered. 23 7 In each
of these cases the plaintiff had failed to start the process of appeal
before the time for appeal had run.
In the second category the bond was filed or approved by the
wrong official. In one case the appellant gave the bond to the clerk
of the supreme court rather than the clerk of the district court;238
in the second case the bond was
approved by the district court clerk
239
rather than the county clerk.
In the third category the case was
filed in the wrong county
240
and dismissed for improper venue.
The cases in the first and second categories involved situations
in which the possibility of failure of notice to the adverse party
existed, while Peck v. Dunlevey2 41 involved the question of venue.
All of these cases support the proposition that where appeal is
granted by statute the requirements of the statute must be fulfilled
to the letter before subject matter jursidiction is conferred on the
court. The general rule, however, is that such bonds must comply
substantially with the statutory requirements. Any defect may be
24 2
cured by amendment.
Nebraska allowed amendments to appeal bonds at a very early
date. In Rube v. Cedar County24 3 the court said:
This undertaking, although informal, is not void. The proceedings,
while irregular, were sufficient to give the district court jurisdiction.
The plaintiff in error appears to have acted in good faith and should
have been given an opportunity to file a new and sufficient bond.244
235
236

237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

Radil v. State, 182 Neb. 291, 294, 154 N.W.2d 466, 468 (1967).
Brown v. Omaha, 179 Neb. 224, 137 N.W.2d 814 (1965); Drier v.
Knowles Vans, Inc., 144 Neb. 619, 14 N.W.2d 222 (1944); Sommerville
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 116 Neb. 282, 216 N.W. 815, affirmed on
rehearing,117 Neb. 507, 221 N.W. 433 (1928).
Cedar County v. McKinney Loan & Inv. Co., 1 Neb. (Unof.) 411, 95
N.W. 605 (1901).
Barney v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 144 Neb. 230, 13
N.W.2d 120 (1944).
Reiber v. Harris, 179 Neb. 582, 139 N.W.2d 353 (1966).
Peck v. Dunlevey, 184 Neb. 812, 172 N.W.2d 814 (1969).
Id.
Cf. Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 107 U.S. 378 (1882).
35 Neb. 896, 53 N.W. 1009 (1892).
Id. at 898, 53 N.W. at 1009.
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There the taxpayer had failed to sign the appeal bond, but the
court looked to substance rather than form and allowed amendment.
In the present case the missing signature was that of a state
official whose function is ministerial and did not affect the value
of the bond. Several recent cases in Nebraska have also allowed
amendment to bonds that failed to precisely meet the statutory
requirements. In State ex rel. Miller v. Cavet 245 the court favorably cited the earlier Rube decision and held that an appeal bond
given by the sheriff, although not double the amount of the judgment and costs as required by statute,246 was sufficient to lodge
jurisdiction in the district court:
The bond was approved and filed by the county judge. Such a bond
is not void although it fails to comply with all the formalities of the
law. In such cases the district court may permit or require the filing
of a new bond, but it may not properly dismiss an247
appeal where it
is possible to amend or replace the irregular bond.

In In re Estate of Hoagland,248 the court allowed the bond to
be amended in order to add a second surety as required by statute.
This rule was also followed in State v. Kidder.249 The court in
Kidder, citing the amendment statute,250 said:
The action of the trial court in permitting and approving the amendments to the appeal bond is approved as being not only within the
spirit, 251
but as required by the express wording, of the statute
quoted.
In Ballantyne Co. v. Omaha252 the court approved the filing of
an additional appeal bond "to pay all costs adjudged against the
plaintiff" 253 and in this manner avoided the amendment question.
245

246
247
248
249
250

251
252
253

163 Neb. 584, 80 N.W.2d 692 (1947).
STAT. § 24-544 (Reissue 1964).
163 Neb. at 586-87, 80 N.W.2d at 694.
128 Neb. 219, 258 N.W. 538 (1935).
169 Neb. 181, 98 N.W.2d 800 (1959).
"The court may, either before or after judgment, in furtherance of
justice, and on such terms as may be proper, amend any pleading,
process or proceeding, by adding or striking out the name of any
party or by correcting a mistake in the name of the party, or a mistake in any other respect, or by inserting other allegations material
to the case, or, when the amendment does not change substantially
the claim or defense, by conforming the pleading or proceedings to the
facts proved. Whenever any proceeding taken by a party fails to conform, in any respect, to the provisions of this code, the court may
permit the same to be made conformable thereto by amendment."
NEB.REV. STAT. § 25-852 (Reissue 1964).
169 Neb. at 185, 98 N.W.2d at 803.
173 Neb. 229, 113 N.W.2d 486 (1962).
Id. at 231, 113 N.W.2d at 488.
NEB. REv.
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Clearly the basic question in this area is when is a bond so
defective that it cannot be amended? As the law now stands, one
must file an approved bond before the time for appeal has run, but
almost any other defect is subject to correction by amendment or
the filing of an additional bond. There are good reasons for limiting the time in which an appeal may be taken, for requiring that
bonds be filed, and for requiring that those bonds should be approved. However, where the failure to have the specific bond approved does not go to the sufficiency of the bond or the question of
proper notice to the adverse party of the intention to appeal, it
seems unnecessary to so strictly construe the statutes.
The statutes allowing amendment 54 are remedial in effect and
should be liberally construed. In any event, in Lydick no question
existed as to the sufficiency of the bond or the surety. Several states
list approved surety companies but Nebraska's only requirements
are that a surety "be a resident of this state and must have property,
liable to execution, situate in the county in this state in which such
undertaking . .. is to be given and filed." 255 The implied consent
law provides that the bond be filed in the office of the department
of motor vehicles and that the action be brought in the county in
which the plaintiff lives or in which the events leading to a revocation occurred. These requirements result in the anomalous situation that one must secure the bond and the approval of the auditor,
send it to Lincoln to be filed, and bring the action in the local
county.
Perhaps outstate lawyers should personally carry the bond to
the capital to insure their clients have a chance to seek vindication
of their rights. At best a lawyer may be faced with the prospect of
losing on procedural matters when no real adverse interest is prejudiced by amendment. Implicit in the holding of Lydick seems
to be a wish to dispose of implied consent appeals on procedural
grounds rather than on their merits. Even if this were a proper
objective, the decision may also be applied to cases not involving
the implied consent rule, thus unduly restricting considerations of
the merits of their claims as well.

25

255

"The court in every stage of an action must disregard any error or
defect in the pleading or proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect." NEB. Ray. STAT.
§ 25-853 (Reissue 1964).
NEB. Ray. STAT. § 25-2223 (Reissue 1964).
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D. Schmer v. Gilleland, 185 Neb. 54, 173 N.W.2d 391 (1970).
In Schmer v. Gilleland256 the court considered some of the problems that arise under the Nebraska motor vehicle long arm statute. 57 After an accident on February 19, 1962, the plaintiff filed
a petition in the District Court of Madison County and a summons
was served on the Nebraska Secretary of State on February 19, 1966.
No affidavit of service was filed with the court, as is required by
the statute. Subsequently two more summonses were procured
by the plaintiff and served on the secretary of state but again no
affidavit was fied.
In February 1968, plaintiff changed attorneys. His second
attorney again had summonses issued and served and on March
25, 1968, filed the required affidavit. The defendant filed special
appearances to each of the summonses. The trial court sustained
special appearances as to the first three summonses but overruled
as to the last one.
At this point defendant demurred for failure to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action on the grounds that the
action was barred by the statute of limitations.258 The district court
held that the demurrer searched the record for the date of commencement of the action, so the failure to file an affidavit of notice
on the February 19, 1966, summons deprived the court of subject
matter jurisdiction. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the
action of the district court, holding that "[a] demurrer on the
ground of the statute of limitations opens the record pertaining
259
to the time the action was commenced.
This was an affirmation of a recent change in Nebraska decisions. The relevant Nebraska statute says: "The defendant may
demur to the petition only when it appears on its face (1) that
the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or the
subject of the action. .
".'.60
A long line of cases have held that
demurrers only question the face of the petition:
In the case of Peters v. DunnelUs, 5 Neb. 460, the court, in the
opinion, say [sic]: "The principle is well settled under our code, that
where it appears on the face of the petition that the cause of action
arose at such period that under the statute of limitation no action

256

257
258
259

260

185 Neb. 54, 173 N.W.2d 391 (1970).
STAT. § 25-530 (Reissue 1964).
Brief for Appellee at 15, Schmer v. Gilleland, 185 Neb. 54, 173 N.W.2d
391 (1970).
185 Neb. at 56, 173 N.W.2d at 393.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-806 (Reissue 1964) (emphasis added).
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can be brought, the defendant may demur to the petition on the
ground 26
that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action." 1
"It is well settled in this state that when it is not apparent from
the petition that the debt is barred, the statute of limitation must
be taken advantage of by answer. '262 Later in Reliance Trust Co. v.
Atherton,263 the court said:
The principal question in this case, is whether the county court
erred in overruling the demurrer to the petition, and that question
depends on whether it appears on the face of the petition
that the
264
cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.
This language was repeated in several cases.2 65
In Gorgen v. County of Nemaha266 the court cited Reliance Trust
as authority for the language: "Where the record shows that the
action was not commenced within the time required, the petition
is subject to demurrer. 26 7 However, in Reliance Trust the court
also stated that the material question was whether the petition was
barred on its face by the statute of limitations. It now appears that
there are two lines of authority on the effect of a demurrer based
on the statute of limitations.
The statute and most of the cases interpreting it indicate that
the bar must appear on the face of the petition. Reliance Trust
says that the return of the summons is part of the petition. Gorgen
and Schmer hold that the demurrer searches the record for the
date of commencement of the action. Thus, it appears that the court
has overruled sub silentio a long and well established precedent
in Nebraska.
Writers on this subject have considered the better rule to be
that a demurrer searches the record for the time of commencement
of the action. 268 When the question arises on motion whether an
action has been brought within the statutory time, the trial judge
261
262
263

Merriam v. Miller, 22 Neb. 218, 224, 34 N.W. 625, 627 (1887).
Hanna v. Emerson, 45 Neb. 708, 713, 64 N.W. 229, 231 (1895).
67 Neb. 305, 93 N.W. 150, rehearing denied, 67 Neb. 309, 96 N.W. 218
(1903).
Id. at 307, 93 N.W. at 151.

264
265 Tennyson v. Werthman, 167 Neb. 208, 92 N.W.2d 559 (1958); Vielehr

v. Malone, 158 Neb. 436, 63 N.W.2d 497 (1954); In re Estate of McCleneghan, 145 Neb. 707, 17 N.W.2d 923 (1945); Rohlff v. German Old
People's Home, 143 Neb. 636, 10 N.W.2d 686 (1943).
266
267
268

174 Neb. 588, 118 N.W.2d 758 (1962).
Id. at 589, 118 N.W.2d at 759.
See Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of Limitations, 36
(1927) and C. CLARK, CODE PLEADiNG 522 (2d ed. 1947).

YALE
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should be allowed to use the entire record to that point in time
necessary to answer the question. The old rule in Nebraska limits
the courts to the face of the petition. Although the Nebraska court
has not yet provided a sweeping analysis of the problem as presented by previous opinions, the better rule has now been adopted
by Nebraska.
The statute of limitations is normally an affirmative defense.
Plaintiffs are not required to anticipate affirmative defenses in their
petition so that if there are facts which bar application of the statute of limitations, sustaining a demurrer raising the defense might
preclude consideration of the facts avoiding the statute. However,
Nebraska allows amendments to a petition within ten days of the
filing of a demurrer as a matter of course.269 Thus, the plaintiff
cannot be prejudiced if the issue is raised by demurrer for he can,
through amendment, plead any facts avoiding the statute of limitations.

What may ultimately be the more important question presented
by this case is whether failure to file the statutory affidavit that
notice of the service of summons on the Secretary of State has
been sent to the defendant serves to defeat jurisdiction of the court.
The court in Schmer could have held that the action was com-

menced 70when the Secretary of State was served pursuant to
2
statute

The rule that a suit against an in-state defendant is commenced
by service of process on the defendant requires no citation. However, when an action is brought under a long arm statute, the
question arises: is the action commenced by service on the proper
state official or when service is had or notice is given the defendant?
The purpose of long arm statutes is to acquire personal jurisdiction over outstate defendants through service on the proper
state official. The question then arises whether there are good
reasons to defeat jurisdiction because of failure to file an affidavit
that notice has been sent to the defendant. Several jurisdictions
have considered this question. The majority have held that the
action commences at the time there is service upon the state official.
The plaintiff in Rielly v. Crook1c7 failed to file an affidavit that
notice had been sent to the defendant. The Georgia court said:
The question, then, is whether the failure to file a return receipt
and an affidavit of compliance were amendable defects. . . . The
269
270

271

NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-850 (Reissue 1964).
NEB. REV.

STAT.

§ 25-530 (5) (Reissue 1964).

112 Ga. App. 334, 145 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965).
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evidence prescribed by statute to show service was incomplete but
this was an amendable defect....
Since the record prima facie shows jurisdiction of the defendant,
and the motion to set aside the judgment does not affirmatively
allege that defendant did not receive a copy of the petition from the
Secretary of State, ... the court did not err in sustaining
the motion
272
to dismiss the motion to set aside the judgment.
California 27- and Tennessee 27 4 have held that service on the
secretary of state prior to the running of the statute is effective
even if notice is not received by the defendant until after the statute of limitations has run. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana has
pointed out some relevant distinctions between service on the state
official and notice to the defendant under long arm statutes:
There is a distinction between the service of legal process and
the mere notice to be given the defendants of such service as provided for in this statute. In the first instance, the service is clothed
with certain formalities which are not required in the second instance. .

.

. It is clear that the act of service per se in such cases is

completed when a proper officer has delivered to the secretary of
state copies of the citation and petition. But, as a safeguard to the
rights of nonresident defendants, and perhaps to make the act comply
with the requirements pertaining to the question of due process of
law, the act requires that, before any judgment can be rendered in
the case against them, it must be shown that copies of the citation
and petition have either been mailed to them or handed them in person .... 275
New York has considered a similar question. Notice was mailed
to nonresident defendants prior to service of the summons and
complaint on the secretary of state. Even though the notice failed
to include a copy of the summons and complaint the court upheld
jurisdiction by allowing amendment. 6
Emery TransportationCo. v. Baker 27 7 announced a more restrictive view. Plaintiffs had sent a registered letter to defendant containing notice of the suit. The defendant was not home when the
letter was delivered, and did not pick it up at the post office. The
Iowa court said:
Clearly, then, the act of timely mailing a notification, properly addressed, by restricted registered mail, does not end plaintiffs obligation. A receipt showing it has been delivered is required by [the
272
273
274
275
276
277

Id. at 336-37, 145 S.E.2d at 112 (citation omitted).
Solet v. Linch, 46 Cal. 2d 99, 292 P.2d 887 (1956).
Noseworthy v. Robinson, 203 Tenn. 683, 315 S.W.2d 259 (1957).
Allen v. Campbell, 141 So. 827, 829 (La. Ct. App. 1932).
Genovese v. Sanaseverino, 26 Misc. 2d 191, 206 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup.
Ct. 1960).
254 Iowa 744, 119 N.W.2d 272 (1963).
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long arm statute], and with the possible exception of refusal by
addressee to accept offered delivery of same, plaintiff278must show
actual delivery of the notice, usually by return receipt.
Originally the Deleware Supreme Court also strictly interpreted

the notice requirement but it has recently retracted its position
somewhat, saying:
We are of opinion that the proof of service is no part of the service
itself.... The filing of the affidavit is analogous to a sheriffs return of personal service, which, if not
filed on the time specified,
279
may by court order be filed later ....

In the present case it is interesting to note that the defendant,
in objecting to the original summons and petition, never alleged
that he failed to receive notice of the suit. His contention was that
the plaintiff's failure to file the required affidavit was a jurisdictional defect, and that therefore, he was not brought within the
jurisdiction of the court. In the absence of clarification by the supreme court the lower courts are free to so hold.
The long arm statute states no time in which the affidavit must
be filed. 28 0 The plaintiff finally on March 25, 1969, filed the required
affidavit which was dated March 2, 1969.211 It is questionable

whether at this late date an affidavit would comply with the statute.
But at the first hearing in the case plaintiff could have been directed
to comply with the statute and defendant allowed to rebut receipt
of the notice. Had this procedure been followed it is doubtful that
some three years would have been expended to decide that a
demurrer searches the record.

Id. at 750, 119 N.W.2d at 277.
Lightburn v. Delaware Power & Light Co., 52 DeL 415, 421, 158 A.2d
919, 923 (1960) (citation omitted).
280 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-530 (Reissue 1964).
281 Brief for Appellee at 17, Schmer v. Gilleland, 185 Neb. 54, 173 N.W.2d
278
279

391 (1970).

